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Abstract 
Ninety-one court examinations of lawyers asking questions to witnesses were analyzed. 
Each unique examination was coded for the frequency of utterance type being spoken 
(i.e., questions identified as open-ended, probing, closed yes-no, leading, forced choice, 
multiple, clarification, re-asked, as well as for offered opinions and facilitators), the 
assumed purpose type of each utterance (i.e., unknown, administrative, information 
gathering, challenging the witness’ account/details), lawyer type (i.e., prosecutor vs. 
defence), and examination type (i.e., direct vs. cross). The results showed that 
approximately 80% of the questions asked were inappropriate for gathering reliable 
information. In addition, there were no significant differences found between prosecutors 
or defence lawyers regarding the proportions of the utterance type spoken. However, 
there was a significant difference with some utterance types as a function of examination 
type; direct examinations contained significantly more closed yes-no, probing, and open-
ended questions, whereas cross examinations contained significantly more leading and 
clarification questions. There were no significant differences found between lawyer type 
as a function of purpose type, with the exception of cross (vs. direct) examinations 
containing significantly more challenges. Although the findings were expected, these data 
suggest that the vast majority of courtroom questioning practices run counter to the truth-
seeking function of the judiciary. Implications for the role of these questioning practices 
in the courtroom are discussed, along with the extent to which courtroom interviewing 
practices are in line with the concerns raised by lawyers when arguing against the 
inadmissibility of statements due to inadequate police interviewing practices.  
Keywords: courtroom questioning, lawyers, truth-seeking, question types  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
An overarching goal of the criminal justice system is for triers of fact to make 
informed decisions. This is facilitated primarily through the gathering of accurate and 
complete information from victims, witnesses, and suspects (Milne & Bull, 1999). The 
information required to make the best informed decisions tends to be collected through 
police interviewing, and to a lesser extent, through courtroom examinations. Regardless 
of who gathers the information, arguably the most fundamental aspect of these processes 
(i.e., police interviews and courtroom examinations) is asking questions (Oxburgh, 
Myklebust, & Grant, 2010). Empirical studies have shown that the types of questions 
asked impact the quality of the information gathered (e.g., Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978; 
Loftus & Palmer, 1974), with most of the research in the area focusing on how well 
police officers conduct their interviews. Collectively, the glut of this empirical literature 
has reported that police interviewers do not tend to follow best practice for gathering 
information (e.g., Fisher, Geiselman, & Raymond, 1987; Myklebust & Alison, 2000; 
Snook & Keating, 2010; Snook, Luther, Quinlan, & Milne, 2012; Wright & Alison, 
2004), despite some officers having had received training about proper interviewing 
techniques (Lamb, Hernshkowitz, Orbach, & Esplin, 2008). Moreover, the (poor) 
questioning practices of the police often form the foundation of strategies by defence 
lawyers (e.g., use experts to testify that the overuse of leading questions tainted the 
evidence). Surprisingly, little empirical attention has been paid to how well lawyers – 
through their questioning practices – influence the quality of information gathered in the 
courtroom. 
Of the extant empirical studies that have examined the questioning practices of 
lawyers, most have pertained to questioning vulnerable witnesses (e.g., children; 
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witnesses with intellectual disabilities; e.g., Andrews & Lamb, 2016; Kebbell, Hatton, & 
Johnson, 2004; Zajac, Gross, Hayne, 2003), contained small sample sizes (e.g., Kebbell, 
Deprez, & Wagstaff, 2003), are limited to a few judiciaries (i.e., Scotland [e.g., Andrews 
& Lamb, 2016], Australia [e.g., Kebbell et al., 2003, 2004], and New Zealand [e.g., Zajac 
et al., 2003; Zajac & Cannan, 2009]), and focused mainly on sexual assault crimes (i.e., 
rape; e.g., Andrews & Lamb, 2016; Kebbell et al., 2003; Westera, Zydervelt, Kaladelfos, 
& Zajac, 2017). The goal of current research program is to contribute to the growing 
body of research on courtroom questioning practices by examining the extent to which 
Canadian lawyers adhere to best practices. This goal is accomplished by using a larger 
sample size than used in previous studies, and by using a more generalizable group of 
adult witnesses (i.e., different crimes and witness types).  
1.1 Questioning and Memory 
 Asking questions is the sine qua non of the justice system’s truth-seeking 
function. Much research has been devoted to studying the relationship between question 
types and information gathering quantity and quality (e.g., Clifford & George, 1996; 
Fisher et al., 1987; Loftus, 1982; Loftus & Palmer, 1974; Loftus & Zanni, 1975; McLean, 
1995; Milne & Bull, 1999; Snook & Keating, 2010; Snook et al., 2012; Wright & Alison, 
2004), and many of these studies have reported that asking particular questions can 
directly impact the accuracy and completeness of witnesses’ testimony and memory (e.g., 
Clifford & George, 1996; Davies, Westcott & Horan, 2000; Fisher et al., 1987; Loftus & 
Palmer, 1974; Memon, Holley, Milne, Koehnken, & Bull, 1994; Memon & Vartoukian, 
1996; Memon, Vrij, & Bull, 2003; Milne & Bull, 1999; Read, Powell, Kebbell, & Milne, 
2009; Shepherd, 2007).  
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It is essential for questioners to ask questions that empirical research has shown to be the 
gold standard for eliciting accurate and reliable testimony (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992; 
Griffiths & Milne, 2006; Milne & Bull, 1999).  
1.1.1 “Good” questions. Although there is some discrepancy between scholars 
on how question types are classified and/or defined (e.g., Fisher et al., 1987 vs. Griffiths 
& Milne, 2006; see Milne & Bull, 1999, & Oxburgh et al. 2010), the literature generally 
agrees on what questions are considered to be superior (and inferior) for gathering 
reliable and accurate information in the interview setting; a topic that has been a point of 
scholarly interest for a long time. Studies examining interview questioning styles date 
back to the turn of the 20th century. Early scholars (e.g., Stern 1903/1904; Varendonck, 
1911) classified questions into one of two categories: Bericht (i.e., open) or Verhör (i.e., 
closed). Since this time, others have categorized questioning style using terms such as, 
active and passive (DuBois, 1937); guided and free (Kluckhohn, 1945); or directive and 
non-directive (Maccoby & Maccoby, 1954). More recently, contemporary researchers 
typically use terms like inappropriate and appropriate (Milne & Bull, 1999), or 
productive and non-productive (Griffiths & Milne, 2006). Regardless of the categorical 
name assigned to classify questioning strategies, research has shown that open-ended 
questions are the premier choice for gathering complete and accurate information from 
witnesses.  
Structurally, open-ended questions tend to start with Tell, Explain, or Describe 
(TED questions; e.g., “Tell me about your evening last night.”, “Describe the assailant for 
me.”). Open-ended questions are viewed as the most preferred questions to ask because 
such invitations allow for free and uninhibited recall from the respondent, and encourage 
longer and more accurate responses (Milne & Bull, 1999; Snook et al., 2012). Of all the 
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question types, asking open-ended questions has been found to result in respondents 
providing the most accurate information (i.e., the proportion of correct vs. incorrect is 
greatest; Kebbell et al., 2003). Importantly, the mere structure of open-ended questions 
also protects against the questioner suggesting any of their own biases or viewpoints onto 
the person being questioned. Although it is possible that the respondent may still provide 
erroneous information, it is important to consider that the questioner did not play a role in 
soliciting that information. 
A secondary productive or appropriate question type, but are narrower in scope, 
are probing questions. In terms of structure, probing questions typically start with Who, 
What, Where, Why, When, or How (5WH questions; e.g., “Who was with you last 
night?”, “Where did this crime occur?”, “How long were you with this person?”). While 
it is preferred to begin questioning using as many open-ended questions as possible, 
sometimes the responses lack specificity and require further inquiry (e.g., lacking enough 
precise detail to press charges or implicate a person of a crime; Westera et al., 2017). 
Thus, probing questions should be thought of as the appropriate follow-up type of 
questions to further comprehension, and probe the information gained from previously 
asked open-ended questions. For example, the response to the open-ended question “Tell 
me about the room you were in?” may yield information outlining particular items of 
interest (e.g., weapon, drug paraphernalia). Following up with probing questions might 
further provide specifics on these items: “You mentioned you saw a weapon. What sort 
of weapon was it?”; “Where was the weapon located?” Taken together, open-ended and 
probing questions are recognized by interviewing experts1 as two question types that best 
produce accurate and complete information from interviewees.  
LAWYERS’ QUESTIONING PRACTICES 
 
5 
 
1.1.2 “Bad” questions. Various other questions are almost unanimously agreed 
upon by researchers as being associated with poor questioning. That is, questions that are 
extremely specific or leading in nature can steer the witness toward a certain answer and 
have the potential to contaminate the witness’ memory (Westera et al., 2017). The 
following question types fit into this concerning category and can place limits onto the 
respondent, calling into question the authenticity of the information gathered from the 
witness. These poor questioning concerns become magnified if the witness is vulnerable 
(e.g., children [Zajac et al., 2003], witnesses with disabilities [Kebbell et al., 2004], 
intoxicated, sleep deprived), or prone to yea-saying (i.e., acquiescence; Kebbell, Hatton, 
Johnson, & O’Kelly, 2001; Zajac, 2009). In fact, some studies have shown that 
vulnerable populations will attempt to answer questions that they do not understand or 
even questions that make no sense (e.g., “Is red heavier than yellow?”; Pratt, 1990; 
Waterman, Blades, & Spencer, 2001).  
One ineffective question type is known as a closed yes-no question. Closed yes-
no questions request answers that are extremely narrow in scope, and tap only into 
recognition memory. Typically, closed yes-no questions are answered with one word or 
short responses (e.g., Question – “Did the thief have red hair?” Answer – “No, he did 
not.”). If the goal of questioning is to obtain as much accurate information as possible, 
then asking closed yes-no questions facilitates limited responding and focuses on a small 
aspect of interest. Granted, a questioner may ask a closed yes-no question to confirm 
information that they are privy to, but such an approach opens up the opportunity for 
misinformation to be adopted by the respondent. Closed-ended questions also cause the 
respondent to take on a passive role in the interview process. Since answers to closed yes-
no questions yield relatively little additional information, the witness does not have to 
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work hard at retrieving the requested information from memory. Put differently, asking 
questions that only tap into recognition aspects of memory renders the witness a passive 
participant in the questioning process because s/he is only confirming/denying notions 
presented by the questioner. Moreover, there is no way to know whether the witness is 
simply guessing at the answer. The consensus within the scientific community is that 
asking closed yes-no2 questions should be done so sparingly (Griffiths & Milne, 2006; 
Griffiths, Milne, & Cherryman, 2011).  
Leading questions are arguably the epitome of the ‘bad’ questions, and should be 
avoided during an interview. By definition, a leading question contains a preferential 
answer from the respondent, and may contain other (possibly correct or incorrect) 
information embedded within the question (e.g., “The car was driving quite fast before 
the crash, right?”). It may be tempting for a questioner to ask a leading question if they 
have developed a preconceived hypothesis about the event in question (i.e., the vehicle 
was speeding). However, carrying such a viewpoint into the interview setting has already 
sabotaged the information-seeking function of the investigative interview, and has turned 
it into a confirmation-seeking exercise (Gibbons, 2003; Maley, 1994; see Newbury & 
Johnson, 2006). Recall the above leading question example: beyond the problem of 
providing information to the respondent via the question (i.e., type of vehicle, speed of 
vehicle) – which may be factually wrong to begin with – a more concerning issue with 
leading questions is that the respondent may adopt this information into their testimony. 
Doing so brings in concerns about the reliability and validity of the reported information. 
That is, the information actually originated from the questioner and not the respondent. 
Furthermore, if the respondent adopts the information embedded within the question, the 
questioner may interpret the respondent’s answer as confirming their original hypothesis, 
LAWYERS’ QUESTIONING PRACTICES 
 
7 
 
adding to the concerns of leading questions. Although some researchers distinguish 
between varying levels of leading questions (e.g., suggestive [Sternberg, Lamb, Esplin, 
Orbach & Hershkowitz, 2002], misleading [Milne & Bull, 1999], mildly vs. heavily 
leading [Kebbell et al., 2003]), it is generally agreed that any type of leading question 
may taint the information gathered from witnesses. 
Forced choice questions (aka fixed alternative [Richardson, Dohrenwend, & 
Klein, 1965], selections [Hargie, Saunders & Dickenson, 1987], or option-posing 
questions [Korkman, Santtila, Westeråker, & Sandnabba, 2008; Luther, Snook, Barron, & 
Lamb, 2015; Shepherd, 2007]) present the respondent with a controlled range of possible 
answers to choose from (e.g., “Did this crime occur last week or two weeks ago?”). The 
concern with this type of question is that response limits are placed on the respondent by 
the questioner (Fritzley & Lee, 2003). Moreover, the correct answer (e.g., the crime 
occurred two days ago) may not be one of the available options. Research conducted with 
vulnerable witnesses has shown that respondents may simply guess at the answer and 
arbitrarily choose one of the choices that the questioner provided, even when the correct 
answer is not one of the options (Larsson & Lamb, 2009; Milne, Clare, & Bull, 1999). In 
other child sample studies, option-posing questions have been reported as putting 
pressure on the respondent to give an answer (Saywitz, Snyder, & Nathanson, 1999), and 
have also been found to elicit minimal information (i.e., shorter response; Larsson & 
Lamb, 2009). Although a recent study by Luther and colleagues (2015) examining police 
interviews with children found that forced choice questions were asked infrequently by 
questioners (approximately 3% of all questions asked), the respondents still chose one of 
the forced choice options (whether or not either of the options were correct). In fact, the 
results from Luther and colleagues revealed that the first choice option of forced choice 
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questions was chosen by the child respondent over 40% of the time. These findings are 
concerning given that both the information and the answer is being derived from the 
interviewer and not the interviewee. Furthermore, any follow-up questions may be based 
on the potentially incorrect information. Despite the fact that the majority of studies 
exploring the effects of forced choice questioning have been tested with children, 
evidence from other studies suggest that adults are just as susceptible to poor questioning 
practices (e.g., Kebbell et al., 2001; Poole & White, 1991; see Zajac, 2009). For example, 
Kebbell and colleagues (2001) reported that some adults may incorrectly assume that the 
forced choice options provided by the questioner are the only alternatives available, and 
thereby omit the actual correct answer from their response. 
Asking multiple questions (aka marathon questions; Shepard, 2007) in the 
interview setting should also be avoided. Multiple questions refers to the idea of asking 
several questions without giving the respondent an opportunity to provide an answer to 
any one of the questions asked (e.g., “Did you see him at the party? Where was he 
standing? Who else was there? Was he actually standing? When did you go home?”). The 
danger of asking multiple questions is that the respondent does not know which question 
to answer. Furthermore, if the respondent did attempt to give a response following the 
many questions, it is not always clear which question the answer is paired with (e.g., 
Question – “Were a lot of people at the party? Did you drink a lot? How many drinks did 
you have?” Answer – “I’m not really sure. Maybe eight or nine I think”), although some 
findings suggest that the last question asked may typically be the question that the 
respondent answers (Kebbell & Johnson, 2000; Perry et al., 1995). Asking multiple 
questions complicates the information-gathering process, and has the potential to add 
confusion and misunderstanding for both the questioner and respondent.  
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Re-asking a question that has been previously asked earlier in the interview may 
also facilitate confusion. Take for example, a respondent who has earlier been asked 
about what they did last night, and provided an answer of being at home. If the questioner 
asks this same question later on, then the respondent may feel as though their previous 
answer has not satisfied the questioner, especially interviewees who are vulnerable (e.g., 
children; Myers, Saywitz, & Goodman, 1996) or in a vulnerable state (e.g., sleep 
deprived; intoxicated). Moreover, if the respondent decides to amend their previous 
response by saying that they were not at home, but instead were at a party, then this sort 
of scenario may give rise to suspicion or doubt toward the information provided (i.e., the 
reliability of the information). On the other hand, asking the same question over and over 
again suggests that the questioner is not listening actively to the respondent, is not skilled 
at interviewing, or is trying to elicit a response that may be in line with any previously 
held hypotheses about the event in question. The literature has raised concerns about 
asking repeated questions to witnesses because of its perception of being coercive and the 
fact that the testimony provided may change, thus giving rise to its credibility (e.g., 
Brock, Fisher, & Cutler, 1999; Gilbert & Fisher 2006; Poole & Lamb, 1998; Poole & 
White 1993). However, work by La Rooy and Lamb (2011) with a sample of 37 children 
aged 4 to 11 years, found that repeating questions led to the respondents maintaining their 
previous answer 54% of the time, but had also led the children to elaborate on their 
previous response about 27% of the time.  
Questions that involved reciting verbatim what the respondent has stated, or 
paraphrasing the answer back to the witness in the form of a question are known as 
clarification questions (e.g., Question – “What flight was he on?” Answer – “It was flight 
229.” Question – “Okay, so he took flight 229?” Answer – “Yes, exactly.”; clarification 
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question emphasized). Similar to other question types, different researchers refer to this 
questioning style using various titles (e.g., echo questions [Milne & Bull, 1999; Oxburgh, 
Ost, & Cherryman, 2012], parroting [Shepard, 2007]). While it is recognized that this 
type of question may be natural to do from the point of view of the questioner’s 
comprehension (e.g., Korkman, Santtila, & Sandnabba, 2006), the efforts dedicated 
toward asking clarification questions is wasteful of the time allotted to the interview. 
Rather, if the questioner wants to check in with the witness to ensure that they have 
understood the response information correctly, experts have argued that it would be better 
to perform a summary with the respondent – but only after all of the information-
gathering questions have been asked on the topic of interest (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992; 
Milne & Bull, 1999). Providing a summary will protect against the respondent adopting 
any language or concepts that the questioner may use via the clarification question. That 
is, the questioner summarizes back the information using the respondent’s words instead 
of paraphrasing. Moreover, if the questioner is unsure of something the respondent stated, 
rather than ask a clarification question (“You said the car was…”), it would be more 
appropriate to ask an open-ended (e.g., “Tell me more about the car.”), or probing 
question (e.g., “What do you mean by the car was…”). Further, it may be possible that 
paraphrasing the words back to the respondent may result in confusion or adoption of 
misinformation.  
Beyond the aforementioned question types, the literature also notes that opinions 
(i.e., posing a personal belief or viewpoint to the respondent; e.g., “I really believe you 
were at that party and not at home last night.”), or statements (i.e., any possible utterance 
that does not constitute a question; e.g., “This water is for you to drink if you get 
thirsty.”) may be spoken by the questioner throughout the interview. Neither opinions nor 
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statements are questions, per se (i.e., the structure does not expect or facilitate an 
answer), but they both capture important interlocutor utterances that occur during the 
interview process. However, as a questioner, offering an opinion or giving a statement 
about the event of interest does not add any merit to the interview. On the contrary, 
opinions have the potential to sway the respondent’s answer should s/he adopt the 
questioner’s proposed opinion into his or her answer. As is the case with other poor 
question types, concerns about where the information originated from is a factor to 
consider when the questioner offers an opinion. Similarly, the aim of a statement is not to 
gather information from witnesses, although witnesses are free to comment following an 
offered statement, and questioners may use a combination of statements to cue the 
witness toward a topic to be questioned on. It may actually be more appropriate to offer 
statements during the pre-interview stages. In other words, prior to starting the 
substantive part of the questioning, the questioner may find it useful to give an indication 
of the direction that the interview will go (e.g., providing statements referencing the 
purpose of the questions); however, such statements as these are not appropriate in the 
middle of the information-gathering process. Given that the objective of this process is to 
gather information from the witness, these particular utterances during the information 
gathering portion of the interview are not helpful and should be avoided. 
Finally, some literature (e.g., Snook et al., 2012) has proposed facilitators (i.e., 
verbal indicators or encouragements; e.g., “Alright, yeah”, “Okay”, “Mmhmm”) as 
another possible utterance spoken during an interview. The phrasing of facilitators can be 
difficult to define in the interviewing setting (Oxburgh et al., 2010) and consequently can 
be viewed as either a good or bad part of the questioning process, depending on the 
context, tone, and expression of the questioner. On the one hand, muttering “mmhmm” or 
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“yes, okay” may simply be the questioner’s way of displaying their engagement with and 
focus towards the respondent. Furthermore, such verbal cues may encourage the 
respondent to continue providing information. However, such encouragements or 
acknowledgements may be interpreted by the respondent as an indication that s/he is 
saying the correct answer (i.e., information that is pleasing to the questioner). Such 
interpretations can become dangerous should the respondent be unsure as to whether the 
information being reported is accurate (e.g., they are guessing, but the questioner seems 
to be affirming the response). Moreover, if the information being reported is confirming 
the questioner’s preconceived hypotheses, then the questioner may inadvertently 
encourage such confirming responses through the use of facilitators or verbal 
acknowledgments. Given that no research to date appears to have built a strong case for 
whether facilitators are ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in the interview setting, these utterance types 
might be best thought of as ‘neutral’ utterances; however, for the purpose of the current 
study, facilitators will be categorially assigned as being on the poor questioning side in 
order to be more conservative. 
1.1.3 Questioning and its effects on memory. Psychologists generally agree that 
there are three distinct processes involved with memory; namely, encoding, storing, and 
retrieving processes. Encoding has to do with inputting information into memory. Storing 
has to do with retaining the information in a permanent (i.e., long-term memory) or semi-
permanent (i.e., short-term memory) basis. Retrieval (i.e., memory recall) refers to the 
notion of accessing information from memory; otherwise known as remembering (see 
Ekuni, Vaz, & Bueno, 2011 for an in-depth review). It is important to note that the 
quality of each of these memory processes hinges on a number of external elements or 
factors. Take the encoding process, for example; encoding information may be dependent 
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on the state of the person during the event. Perhaps the witness to a crime was inebriated 
with alcohol – studies show that witnesses to a mock-crime who had ingested alcohol 
performed poorly on an eyewitness recall test (Hagsand, Roos-af-Hjelmsäter, Granhag, 
Fahlke, & Söderpalm-Gordh, 2013; Yuille & Tollestrup, 1990). Other studies have 
shown how different factors such as the eyewitness’ stress levels (Yuille, Davies, 
Gibling, Marxsen, & Porter, 1994), the amount of violence observed (Clifford & Hollin, 
1981; Clifford & Scott, 1978), the level of witness’ involvement (Yuille et al., 1994, but 
see Roberts & Blades, 1998 for conflicting findings), and the witness’ focus of attention 
all affect the memory encoding process (see Milne & Bull, 1999). Although all memory 
processes are important concepts for gathering information, the process of most interest 
to the current study is memory retrieval as a function of questioning.  
One of the most important findings in memory research related to retrieval factors 
is the fact that memory is malleable and reconstructive. That is, the repeated processing 
of memory can cause it to change (Loftus, 1979; Simons & Chabris, 2011), often without 
the memory holder being aware that a change has occurred (Neath & Surprenant, 2003). 
Similar to encoding, research has identified a number of factors that affect the retrieval 
process, such as inferences (i.e., people making a guess about a memory; e.g., Loftus & 
Palmer, 1974), stereotypes (i.e., an attempt to fill in memory gaps with typecasts similar 
to the event in question; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973), partisanship (i.e., people with 
particular affiliations or loyalties may be biased in their reporting; Boon & Davies, 1996), 
scripts (i.e., reliance on typical information vs. actual information; Bower, Black, & 
Turner, 1979), emotional factors (e.g., negative emotions can render a hinder of retrieval 
processes; Holmes, 1974), and context effects (i.e., cues from the environment that 
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trigger memories; Godden & Baddeley, 1975). See Milne and Bull (1999) for a more in 
depth review of the above listed factors relative to questioning and memory. 
Research has shown that the way questions are asked can result in different 
information being recalled (e.g., Loftus, 1975; Loftus, Altman, & Geballe, 1975; Loftus 
& Palmer, 1974; Loftus & Zanni, 1975; Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978; Read & Bruce, 
1984; Warren & Lane, 1995). A classic study conducted by Loftus and Palmer (1974) 
demonstrated that simply changing one word within a question was enough to result in 
eyewitnesses providing drastically different answers. In the first experiment, participants 
were shown a film depicting a traffic accident and then asked to answer some questions 
about what they had witnessed. The researchers were most interested in the participants’ 
answer to a question about the traveling speed of the vehicles involved in the accident 
(e.g., “About how fast were the cars going when they hit each other?”). To test whether 
the question in and of itself impacted the answers, the researchers placed participants (n = 
45) into five different groups, and used a different verb within this particular question to 
describe the action of the accident for each group. That is, the word describing the impact 
of the cars was interchanged for other words that conceivably changed in degree of 
severity (e.g., smashed, collided, contacted, or bumped). Results from the first 
experiment showed that participants rated the speed of the vehicles as travelling faster 
when smashed (40.8 mph) was used in the question as compared to collided (39.3 mph), 
bumped (38.1 mph), hit (34.0 mph), or contacted (31.8 mph), F’(5,55) = 4.65, p < .005.  
In Loftus and Palmer’s second experiment, participants again watched a motor 
vehicle accident on film and were put into one of two different groups. The first group 
was asked “About how fast were the cars going when they hit each other?” while the 
second group was asked “About how fast were the cars going when they smashed into 
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each other?” Similar to the first experiment, significant differences were found for rates 
of speed between the smashed (10.46 mph) and hit (8.00 mph) groups, with a medium 
effect size found (d = 0.40). Both groups, however, were asked the question “Did you see 
any broken glass?” In reality, no broken glass was shown in the video depicting the car 
accident. Despite this, the participants in the smashed group (yes = 16) reported that they 
recalled seeing broken glass more often as compared to the hit group (yes = 7), yielding a 
medium effect size (d = 0.59).  
Loftus and Zanni (1975) were also able to demonstrate that changing one word in 
a question from being an indefinite article (i.e., a) to a definite article (i.e., the) produced 
different expectations and responses from participants. Following the same procedure 
outlined above (i.e., participants watched a scene from a car accident and were asked 
questions), the researchers asked the participants to answer a series of questions about the 
film; in particular, some questions pertained to items that had appeared in the film, while 
other questions pertained to items that were not present in the film. For example, half of 
the subjects would read the question “Did you see a broken headlight?” while the other 
half read “Did you see the broken headlight?”. The results indicated that participants in 
the definite article condition reported seeing an item that was not present 15% of the time, 
whereas participants in the indefinite article condition reported seeing a non-existent item 
only 7% of the time. Compared to when the item in question was actually present, 
participants in the definite condition reported seeing the item 17% of time, while 
participants in the indefinite condition reported it 20% of the time (a lack of data resulted 
in not being able to be compute an effect size). Taken together, these studies 
demonstrated that the slightest change of how a question is framed can result in very 
different information recalled from memory. Such findings lend support toward the 
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notion that questioners should aim to only ask ‘good’, as opposed to ‘bad’, questions for 
obtaining accurate information.  
Given that accessing memory is a fundamental piece of the information-gathering 
process, truth-seeking questioners aim to avoid the contamination of the retrieval process 
through poor questioning – much the same way that officers are taught to secure a crime 
scene (see St-Yves, 2014). When it comes to questioning witnesses in the interview 
setting, the questioner is essentially trying to piece together a story based on the 
information provided by the witness. Therefore, questioning should be conducted in such 
a way that preserves the witnesses’ memory. The questioner should avoid asking 
questions that may alter any information in the respondent’s memory. But, is this done in 
reality?  
1.2 Police Questioning 
Most of what we know about interviewing practices by criminal justice 
practitioners come from research on police interviews. Fisher, Geiselman, and Raymond 
(1987) are credited as conducting one of the first studies to analyze police interviews. 
Using a descriptive analysis of 11 video-taped interviews of eyewitnesses by eight 
different police investigators, the researchers found that most questions were very direct 
and elicited brief responses, and little or no assistance was given to enhance the 
witnesses' memory. With regard to question types asked, most were categorized as 
specific and/or direct types of questions (e.g., “What color was the suspect’s shirt?”), 
while very few were classed as open-ended. According to Fisher and colleagues, a typical 
interview consisted of three open-ended (“good”) questions and 26 short-answer or 
narrowly focused (“bad”) questions. In other words, approximately 10% of all questions 
asked during the interviews were deemed to be appropriate for gathering several pieces of 
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information. Moreover, other concerns such as interrupting the witness, excessive use of 
question-answer format, inappropriate sequencing of questions, and using a staccato style 
of questioning (i.e., abrupt speech, punctuated by pauses and interruptive of overall 
conversation) were also observed. It is important to note that the researchers did not 
provide operational definitions for what constituted open-ended vs. narrower scope 
questions; however, the examples provided throughout Fisher et al.’s manuscript suggest 
that open-ended questions consisted of questions akin to “Can you describe what 
happened?”, while direct, short answer questions were “Do you remember whether…?”. 
Without having access to the raw data, it is unknown how these authors quantified such 
question types. 
Almost a decade later, Clifford and George (1996) found that approximately three 
quarters of questions asked by police interviewers were identified as closed yes-no, while 
less than 3% were identified as open-ended questions. Since these studies, there has been 
a push – largely from researchers in the United Kingdom (UK; e.g., Baldwin, 1992a, 
1992b, 1993; Irving, 1980; Irving & McKenzie, 1989, 1993) – for proper interview 
training to be given to police officers conducting such interrogations. An alarming 
number of wrongful conviction cases in the UK led to the introduction of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act in 1986 (for further detail on this legislation, see Zander 1990), 
which resulted in new investigative interviewing techniques being developed that were 
heavily influenced by the principles and concepts in social psychology (e.g., Cognitive 
Interview; Fisher & Geiselman, 1992; PEACE; see Milne & Bull, 1999; see also Snook, 
Eastwood, & Barron, 2014). Although this new style of police interviewing was adopted 
by various police organizations in the UK and others internationally, data examining the 
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questioning practices of many police agencies from around the globe have found less 
than stellar results (see Myklebust & Alison, 2000; Walsh & Milne, 2008). 
 Researchers have also examined the quality of police interviews in Canada. In 
their content analysis of 15 audio-taped police interview transcripts, Wright and Alison 
(2004) coded the questions that police officers asked to the interviewing witness. 
Specifically, the coded question types included those identified as closed yes-no, 
selection (i.e., comparable to “forced choice” as outlined in the present paper), 
identification (i.e., comparable to “probing” as outlined in the present paper), open, 
leading/misleading, re-asking, and clarify questions. The researchers also presented their 
data in a novel form by calculating the time distributions for each of the questions asked 
over the, on average, 40 minute interview. They found that officers asked a closed yes-no 
question once every 49 seconds; an identification (i.e., probing) question every minute; a 
clarification question once every two minutes and 29 seconds; a leading/misleading 
question once every three minutes and 35 seconds; a selection (i.e., forced choice) 
question once every six minutes and 13 seconds; an open-ended question once every six 
minutes and 15 seconds; and re-asked a question once every 10 minutes and 32 seconds.3 
Taken together, data from Wright and Alison’s study indicates that police interviews 
contain, on average, only a third of good quality questions; of this, however, less than 5% 
were open-ended questions. Almost two-thirds of the remaining questions, on average, 
were considered to be poor in nature.  
More recently, Snook and colleagues (2010, 2012) replicated Wright and Alison’s 
(2004) core findings using a larger sample of police interviews and a wider selection of 
question types. In their analysis of 90 police interview transcripts, Snook and Keating 
(2010) found that, on average, approximately: 35% of questions asked were closed yes-
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no questions; 32% were probing; 16% were clarification; and 6% were open-ended; the 
remaining question types (i.e., multiple, re-asked, forced choice, leading, and 
opinion/statement) were found to be asked less than 5%. Similar trends were found in a 
subsequent study by Snook, Luther, Quinlan, and Milne (2012) in an examination of 
police interviews with suspects/accused persons. They found that approximately: 40% of 
the questions asked were closed yes-no; 30% probing; 8% clarification; 7% 
opinion/statement; 6% multiple; all other question types (the same questions identified by 
Snook & Keating) were asked less than 4%. It is worth noting is that open-ended 
questions comprised less than 1% of all questions asked, and according to the 
researchers, approximately over 60% of the suspect interviews did not contain a single 
open-ended question. Although Snook and colleagues (2010, 2012) analyzed a wider 
range of question types than Wright and Alison (2004), the findings and conclusions from 
all of these studies are similar; Canadian police officers are using the best questioning 
practices infrequently.  
 There have also been a number of formal inquiries launched by the Canadian 
courts exploring why miscarriages of justice have occurred in various cases (e.g., FPT 
Heads of Prosecutions Committee Working Group, 2004; Lamer, 2006; Hickman, 
Poitras, & Evans, 1989), and have identified inappropriate interviewing by the police as a 
major concern. In fact, one of the core recommendations from the Report on the 
Prevention of Miscarriages of Justice (FPT Heads of Prosecutions Committee Working 
Group, 2004) suggested that witness interviewers:  
should receive training about the existence, causes and psychology of police-
induced confessions, including why some people confess to crimes they have not 
committed, and the proper techniques for the interviewing of suspects (and 
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witnesses) that are designed to enhance the reliability of the product of the 
interview process (p. 74; emphasis added by current author).  
Moreover, specific recommendations from this report stated that police officers 
need to make great efforts toward preventing any contamination of the witness’ evidence 
through unnecessarily communicating privy information to the witness (i.e., 
recommendation 103; e.g., asking leading and closed questions). It was also explicitly 
recommended that police interviewers should reserve their personal commentary on the 
case or the accused in order to prevent witness contamination (i.e., recommendation 104; 
e.g., offering opinions). 
Interestingly, defence lawyers will raise faults in police interviews if the crime 
proceeds to trial (e.g., Barry, 2017). Pointing out such faults during court proceedings has 
the potential to result in evidence being dismissed (e.g., police interview that contains 
defendant’s confession), and can lead to defendants being acquitted. Such an approach 
taken by defence lawyers essentially takes the police to task by indicating that the 
interviewing approaches and techniques used during their interrogation were wrong and, 
as a result, the malpractice by the police should warrant the lawyers’ client dismissed of 
the charges (for examples, see Ibrahim v. The King, 1914; Lam Chi-ming v. The Queen, 
1991; R v. Mushtaq, 2005; R v. Prager, 1972; Saunders v. United Kingdom, 1996). In 
some cases (e.g., R v. Heron, 2009; United States v. LeBrun, 2004), the defendants have 
been acquitted because interviewing officers either misled the accused about evidence 
during questioning or promised leniencies during the interview (Marcus, 2006; 
Williamson, 2006). Still, there are other court case examples where appellant lawyers 
have unsuccessfully challenged the police’s interviewing and questioning practices (e.g., 
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R v. Oickle, 2000). Nonetheless, the strategy of pointing out poor police interviewing as a 
potential issue is still often raised as a defence argument. 
The issue remains that if police officers are conducting substandard interviews 
with witnesses and suspects that results in questionable information, then it is not 
surprising that lawyers would point this out in the name of justice being served. However, 
if police officers are being accused of tainting evidence through the use of improper 
question practices, a natural follow-up question is how well are the questioners in the 
courtroom (i.e., lawyers) performing at the same task?  
1.3 Courtroom Questioning  
In the courtroom setting, the term used for an interview is ‘examination’. It is 
important to note, however, that while the purpose of a courtroom examination differs 
from a police interview (e.g., the aim of the police is to construct an accurate account of 
the events that transpired, whereas the lawyers’ aim is to convince triers of fact to accept 
their version of the events; Kebbell et al., 2003; Westera et al., 2017), the process is 
largely the same in that witnesses are asked questions about their experience of a past 
event (i.e., the crime). Consequently, the same concerns surrounding the effects of 
questioning on memory applies. In fact, the magnitude of this concern increases given 
that many courtroom witnesses have been previously interviewed and questioned 
multiple times prior to taking the stand (e.g., during the police interview; at depositions). 
Studies have shown that as people are questioned multiple times about past events, their 
reported information becomes increasingly unreliable and inaccurate (see Roediger, 
Jacoby, & McDermott, 1996). 
The types of questions that are asked to witnesses by lawyers will likely be 
dependent on the nature of the examination that the witness is undergoing. In the 
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adversarial system, witness evidence is collected by one of two examinations: direct4 or 
cross examination. A direct examination is conducted by the lawyer who has called the 
witness to the stand. This lawyer (i.e., the direct examiner) will elicit information from 
the witness by asking a series of questions that are considered to be relatively open in 
nature (Evans, 1995; Murphy & Barnard, 1994; Stone, 1995). That is, it is assumed by 
the courts that the witness is friendly to the side that has called them forward to testify.5 
Once the direct examiner has completed their questions to the witness, the opposing 
lawyer is subsequently given an opportunity to ask the witness a series of questions about 
the information that the witness just reported. For example, if the prosecuting lawyer has 
called the witness to the stand, then the defence lawyer would conduct the cross 
examination. The main purpose of cross examination is to test the quality of any of the 
evidence that has been presented during the direct examination (Evans, 1995), regardless 
of its accuracy (Henderson, 2002). As such, the questioning approach is often much less 
friendly than that observed in a direct examination (see Kebbell et al., 2003, 2004). 
Importantly, cross examiners are permitted to ask the exact type of questions that 
directly contradicts the approaches that are recommended for obtaining complete and 
accurate accounts. In fact, Henderson (2002) described cross examination as “a virtual 
how not to guide to investigative interviewing” (p. 279). Many textbooks have written 
about cross examination strategies for discrediting the witness’ direct testimony, and 
include suggestions of always asking leading questions, attacking the witness’ 
credentials, and ensuring the witness feels pressure to recant their testimony (Evans, 
1995; Glissan, 1991; Stone, 1995; Wellman, 1997). Not surprisingly, many others have 
also written about the challenges and problems associated with these aspects of the cross 
examination for expert and lay witnesses alike (e.g., Henderson, Heffer & Kebbell, 2016; 
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Zajac, 2009). Nevertheless, cross examination is considered to be one of the most 
fundamental aspects of the adversarial system (Eichelbaum, 1989; Evans, 1995) as it 
allows the testing of the witness evidence given under direct examination to be 
scrutinized of any inaccuracies or inconsistencies. Cross examination also allows for 
subsequently eliciting extra, useful information in favour of the cross examiner’s case 
(Evans, 1995; Yarmey, 1979).6 
There have been ample studies examining various questioning components of the 
courtroom (e.g., Andrews & Lamb, 2016; Brenann, 1995; Danet 1980; Danet & Bogoch, 
1980; Hanna, Davies, Crothers, & Henderson, 2012; Kebbell et al., 2003, 2004; Kebbell 
& Johnson, 2000; Murphy & Barnard, 1994; Perry et al., 1995; Westera et al., 2017; 
Zajac & Cannan, 2009; Zajac et al., 2003), with most examining the effects of confusing 
courtroom language (i.e., legal terminology and vocabulary) on witnesses. Specifically, 
most courtroom studies have focused on how questions phrased with complicated jargon 
or form (i.e., negatives, double negatives, complex syntax) impact the witness’ 
confidence and accuracy. For example, a study by Perry and colleagues (1995) assessed 
how question forms presented by lawyers to child witnesses in the courtroom impacted 
understanding and accuracy of witness response. The results of this study showed that all 
participants had significantly less comprehension and accuracy in their response when 
asked complex (54%), as compared to simple (90%) questions. In a replication of Perry 
and colleagues’ (1995) work, Kebbell and Johnson (2000) added an additional question 
type (e.g., leading questions) and used an adult population rather than children. Similar to 
the previous findings, confusing questions reduced the participants’ accuracy (d = 1.64) 
and confidence (d = 1.06) in their answers. Moreover, Kebbell and Johnson noted that 
participants rarely asked for any of the confusing questions to be explained or clarified, 
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suggesting that such an approach to questioning (i.e., use of complex and confusing 
language) by lawyers runs counter to the truth-seeking function of the court. 
Less attention, however, has been dedicated to exploring the specific questions 
types that lawyers ask to witnesses in the courtroom, akin to studying of police 
interviews. Of the studies that have assessed courtroom questioning, most have been 
limited by small sample sizes (approximately 6 to 16 transcripts), or have focused on 
cases with a less generalizable sample of witnesses (e.g., children; intellectually disabled 
witnesses; Andrews & Lamb, 2016; Kebbell et al., 2004; Zajac et al., 2003). Although 
focused primarily on victims who were sexually assaulted, Kebbell, Deprez, and 
Wagstaff (2003), and Zajac and Cannan (2009) appear to be the only two studies that 
have quantified lawyers’ questioning practices with an adult victim population.  
In their study, Kebbell and colleagues (2003) investigated the frequency of 
question types asked during courtroom examinations of six alleged rape trials. The 
authors were interested in comparing the types of questions asked to complainants and 
defendants during both sets of examinations. The researchers employed a 2 (complainant 
vs. defendant) X 2 (direct vs. cross examination) quasi-experimental design. Specifically, 
some of the question types explored were open-ended, probing (although Kebbell et al. 
referred to this type as “closed questions”), yes-no questions (comparable to “closed yes-
no questions” as outlined in the present paper), mildly leading questions, heavily leading 
questions, and multiple questions (see Kebbell et al., 2003 for additional question types 
considered). Kebbell et al. did not find any meaningful differences in the types of 
questions asked to a complainant or defendant overall; however, differences emerged 
between the questions asked during the direct and cross examinations. Significantly more 
open-ended and probing questions were asked during the direct examination, whereas 
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significantly more closed yes-no, heavily leading, and multiple questions were asked (as 
expected) during the cross examination. More specifically, for direct examinations of 
complainants, approximately: 22% of questions were open-ended; 27% were probing; 
49% were closed yes-no; 1% were heavily leading; and 3% were multiple. By contrast, 
for cross examinations of a complainants, approximately: 6% of questions were open-
ended; 10% were probing; 82% were closed yes-no; 15% were heavily leading; and 9% 
were multiple. When the witness was a defendant, for direct (vs. cross) examinations, 
approximately: 20% (vs. 12%) of questions were open-ended; 27% (vs. 10%) were 
probing; 50% (vs. 78%) were closed yes-no; 1% (vs. 14%) were heavily leading; and 3% 
(vs. 7%) were multiple. In sum, Kebbell et al.’s (2003) findings suggest that most 
questions asked by lawyers are considered to be poor, or at the very least, constraining 
for the witness to respond fully.  
Zajac and Cannan’s (2009) study extended Kebbell et al.’s (2003) study by 
examining how lawyers asked questions to children vs. adult witnesses. An additional 
consideration of this study was exploring whether or not the type of lawyer asking the 
question (prosecutor vs. defence lawyer) had any effect on the quantity of questions 
asked. Among others, the types of questions considered by Zajac and Cannan (2009) 
were what they referred to as open (comparable to “probing questions” as outlined in the 
present paper), closed (comparable to a combination of “closed yes-no questions” and 
“forced choice questions” as outlined in the present paper), and leading questions (see 
Zajac & Cannan, 2009 for remaining coding categories). The results of their study found 
that prosecuting lawyers (vs. defence lawyers) asked significantly more proportionally 
open questions to both adult (45% vs. 11%) and children (34% vs. 11%), respectively. 
Prosecutors also asked significantly more proportionally closed questions to adults (40%) 
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than defence lawyers (23%). Conversely, defence lawyers (vs. prosecutors) asked 
significantly more proportionally leading questions to both children (46% vs. 23%) and 
adults (66% vs. 15%). Based on this proportional data, these authors concluded that 
prosecutors and defence lawyers differed in questioning style. However, it is important to 
note for both the Kebbell et al. (2003) and the Zajac and Canan (2009) studies that 
questions types were not mutually exclusive; a single question might have been coded as 
both a closed and leading type of question. 
1.4 Current Study 
 To date, there has never been a published empirical study of the questioning 
practices of Canadian lawyers. The main goal of the current study was to assess the types 
of questions being asked to witnesses in the Supreme Court of Newfoundland and 
Labrador, and whether lawyers are adhering to best practices when engaging in a truth-
seeking function. In order to conduct a worthwhile comparison with other studies (e.g., 
Kebbell et al., 2003; Snook & Keating, 2011; Snook et al., 2012; Zajac & Cannan, 2009), 
the questioning practices of lawyers were quantified as a proportion (i.e., mean percent) 
of questions asked during the examination. The aim of the current study was to merge the 
research designs outlined by Kebbell et al. (2003) and Zajac and Cannan (2009), and 
explore courtroom questioning as a function of examination type (direct vs. cross; e.g., 
Kebbell et al., 2003) and lawyer type (prosecuting vs. defence laywer; e.g., Zajac and 
Cannan, 2009) collectively. Additionally, the question types outlined in the Snook and 
colleagues’ (2010, 2012) studies were adopted for use in the current study because in 
comparison to other questioning studies (e.g., Kebbell et al., 2003; Zajac & Cannan, 
2009; Wright & Allison, 2004), Snook et al.’s (2010, 2012) proposed questions offered 
more diverse possible utterances that could potential be captured during content analysis. 
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Moreover, the work of Snook and colleagues was based upon the widely accepted 
proposals of question types as suggested by Griffiths and Milne (2006). 
 To add to the extant literature, the purpose of each question asked was also 
quantified in the present study. No prior studies appeared to have categorized the 
assumed purpose of why each question is asked by lawyers. Given that the Canadian 
court system is under duress due to the large volume of cases in limbo waiting to be tried, 
exploring the purpose of each question may yield information about time management in 
the courtroom. That is, if lawyers dedicate much of their questioning time to utterances 
that do not move the case forward (i.e., utterances not focused on gathering relevant facts 
and information), then such a malpractice approach has the potential to tie up valuable 
courtroom timelines, schedules, and resources. Moreover, spending unproductive time on 
topics or inquires that do not achieve the goal of the judiciary (i.e., seeking the truth) may 
result in longer than anticipated trials, and push other court cases further down the docket 
schedule. A recent Supreme Court of Canada ruling (R v. Jordan, 2016) set precedent 
that if a defendant cannot be tried before a judge within a reasonable amount of time, 
then the defendant’s right to a speedy trial (see Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 2012) becomes 
violated, and the defendant’s case is stayed (i.e., the case gets thrown out rendering the 
defendant free). Perhaps an assessment of the purpose behind each asked question can 
indicate how much time is dedicated toward seeking the truth.  
 Based on trends observed in other studies (e.g., Kebbell et al., 2003; Zajac & 
Cannan, 2009; Westera et al., 2017), it is expected that the questioning practices of 
Canadian lawyers’ will be similar to lawyers from other commonwealth countries. More 
precisely, cross examinations are expected to have significantly more leading questions 
than direct examinations, whereas direct (vs. cross) examinations will contain more 
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probing and open-ended questions. However, it also expected that the frequency of 
asking open-ended questions will be relatively minimal. In terms of the types of questions 
asked by lawyers, it is expected that prosecutors (vs. defence lawyers) will ask a higher 
proportion of open-ended and probing questions, whereas defence (vs. prosecuting 
lawyers) are expected to ask more closed yes-no and leading questions. 
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Chapter 2: Methods 
 The current study used publicly available, archival data from the Supreme Court 
of Newfoundland and Labrador (Trial Division) in St. John’s. Based on the rules and 
recommendations provided by the Tri-Council Policy Statement (Canadian Institutes of 
Health Research, Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, and 
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, 2014), no Institutional 
Review Board approval was required for this study. A consultation with the Chair of the 
Interdisciplinary Committee on Ethics in Human Research board at Memorial University 
of Newfoundland confirmed that a formal ethics review was not required (R. Adams, 
personal communication, 2016). Measures were nevertheless taken to ensure that any 
personally identifying information within the archival data (e.g., case identification 
numbers, names of people involved in court proceedings) were replaced with anonymized 
identifiers. In other words, each case and names of persons involved (e.g., lawyer, judge, 
clerk, and witness) were assigned an arbitrary numeric value for the purposes of data 
entry and analyses.  
2.1 Data Collection Procedure 
Verbatim transcriptions of 12 court cases, in the form of Microsoft Word files, 
were obtained from the Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador. The courthouse 
clerk randomly selected cases from archival files for this study and provided digital 
copies of transcribed cases. Embedded in each court case were discrete sections with 
descriptive headings (e.g., administrative procedures, closing summations by lawyers, 
lawyers’ examinations of witnesses on the stand). Any unique direct or cross 
examinations were individually extracted in its entirety into a new Word document. For 
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ease of analysis, multiple new documents each containing only one unique examination 
(i.e., a direct or cross) of a single witness were then created. 
The method of separating each examination from the raw transcripts was 
facilitated by certain indicators in these transcripts. The starting point of each 
examination (i.e., direct or cross) was always the section heading; it was always bolded, 
underlined, and in all capital letters (e.g., MS. JANE DOE, X’d, SWORN, BY MR. 
JOHN SMITH). The first name indicated the name of the witness, and the second name 
was the name of the lawyer conducting the examination. The ending point of each 
examination was identified in one of two ways. First, the transcript was read to determine 
when the examination was coming to a close (e.g., “No further questions, my lord”), 
which was often made clear when a new section heading indicated that the witness was 
now being questioned by the opposing lawyer (e.g., MS. JANE DOE, XX’d BY MS. 
JANE SMITH). The second indicator was when the transcriber wrote “(WITNESS 
EXCUSED)”, which was typically written by the transcriber when all of lawyers had 
completed their examinations of the witness, and the judge stated explicitly that the 
witness could step down from the stand. See Appendix A for an example of a unique 
examination. 
2.1.1 Special cases of the data collection procedure. Witnesses were sometimes 
required to step down from the stand during the middle of the examination. For instance, 
the opposing lawyer or the judge may develop a concern related to an issue brought up 
during the examination and require a voir dire without the witness present. This was 
indicated by the transcriber writing “(WITNESS ASIDE)”. Any time that this sort of 
scenario took place, only the sections that the witness was on the stand were retained, and 
all other information that occurred while the witness was off the stand was excluded. 
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Once the witness was placed back on the stand, as indicated by a section heading (e.g., 
MS. JANE DOE RESUMES THE STAND, XX’d BY MS. JANE SMITH), the 
continued examination was retained until one of the aforementioned boundary indicators 
were identified. 
Beyond the aforementioned exceptions, one additional decision was made with 
respect to any follow-up examinations outside of the direct and cross examinations. 
Follow-up examinations occurred in eight of the court cases; specifically, there were 17 
re-direct and two re-cross examinations. Given that the lawyer conducting the re-direct 
(or re-cross) examination was always the same lawyer who conducted the original direct 
(or cross) examination, the re-direct (or re-cross) examination was always paired with the 
original direct (or cross) examinations to make a single unique examination document, 
respectively. It is important to note that the rules of engagement for direct and cross 
examinations are the same for re-direct and re-cross examinations (see Evans, 1995). For 
coding purposes, however, the order that the examinations occurred in the actual trial 
(e.g., direct, cross, re-direct, re-cross) was followed. Put differently, the direct and cross 
examinations would be read in their entirety (and coded) prior to reading and coding the 
re-direct portion of the direct examination; likewise, the re-direct examination was 
read/coded before reviewing the re-cross examination (if applicable). Given the nature of 
the data transcription (e.g., section titles indicating type of examination), the coder (i.e., 
author) was not blind to the type of examination being coded. No measures were taken to 
blind the coder to this information because the language used throughout the transcribed 
examinations, by various courtroom players (e.g., judge; “It’s your witness for cross 
examination, Ms. Hines”), clearly indicated the type of examination being conducted. 
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On average, 7.58 (SD = 5.04, Range = 1 – 18) unique examinations (i.e., direct 
and/or cross) were extracted from a single court case file. Any sections of the court cases 
where an examination of a witness was being conducted was retained for analysis; all 
other sections and associated information were excluded from consideration. 
2.2 Sample 
2.2.1 Descriptive statistics for cases. The 12 cases occurred between 1991 and 
2014. Six of the cases pertained to crimes against persons (e.g., assault), and six cases 
were classified as hybrid (i.e., crimes against property and person; e.g., trafficking a 
controlled substance; see Table 1; see also Appendix B, Section 1 for more information 
related to crime types).  
Ten cases had one prosecutor and one defence lawyer, one case had two 
prosecutors and two defence lawyers, and one case had two prosecutors and one defence 
lawyer. Twenty-five different lawyers were involved in the 12 cases (two lawyers were 
each involved in two different cases), and 16 (64.00%) of these lawyers were men. 
2.2.2 Descriptive statistics for examinations. Ninety-one unique examinations 
were extracted from the 12 court cases; there were 47 direct examinations and 44 cross 
examinations, and there were 47 unique witnesses examined. Twenty-six (55.32%) of the 
witnesses were identified as being a prosecution witness (i.e., called to the stand by the 
prosecutor and underwent a direct examination led by the prosecutor), while the 
remaining 21 (44.68%) witnesses were defence witnesses (i.e., called and underwent 
direct examination by the defence lawyer). In terms of witness type, 23 (48.94%) were 
eyewitnesses, 15 (31.91%) were police officers, five (10.64%) were defendants, three 
(6.38%) were victims, and one (2.13%) was a character witness. Twenty-nine (61.70%) 
of the witnesses were men. With the exception of three witnesses whom only experienced 
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a direct examination, all other witnesses underwent both a direct and cross examination 
(see Table 2 for the gender of each witness type, based on pronouns, for each court case). 
The mean number of examinations conducted by each of the 25 different lawyers was 
3.64 (SD = 2.86, Range = 1 – 9). Of the 91 unique examinations, 47 (51.65%) were 
conducted by a prosecutor and 44 (48.35%) were conducted by a defence lawyer. 
 
Table 1. Number of Direct and Cross Examinations as a Function of Year and Crime 
Type  
 
Case # 
 
Year 
 
Crime 
Type 
 
Number of 
 Direct 
Examinations 
 
Number of 
 Cross Examinations 
 
     
1 
 
1991 Person 9 9 
2 
 
2006 Hybrid 1 1 
3 
 
2008 Hybrid 3 3 
4 
 
2009 Hybrid 3 3 
5 
 
2009 Hybrid 2 2 
6 
 
2010 Person 3 3 
7 
 
2012 Hybrid 1 1 
8 
 
2012 Person 6 5 
9 
 
2013 Person 8 8 
10 
 
2013 Person 4 2 
11 
 
2013 Hybrid 4 4 
12 
 
2014 Person 3 3 
 
 
  
 
Table 2. Witness Type, Witness Gender, and Number of Examinations for Each Witness 
 
 
Case # 
 
Witness 
 
 
Gender 
 
# of Examinations 
 
Case # 
 
Witness 
 
Gender 
 
# of Examinations 
 
        
1 Eyewitness Female 2 8 Police Officer Male 2 
 Victim Female 2  Police Officer Male 2 
 Eyewitness Male 2  Police Officer Male 2 
 Victim Female 2  Police Officer Male 2 
 Victim Female 2  Police Officer Male 1 
 Character Male 2  Police Officer Male 2 
 Eyewitness Female 2     
 Eyewitness Male 2 9 Eyewitness Female 2 
 Eyewitness Male 2  Eyewitness Female 2 
     Eyewitness Male 2 
2 Defendant Male 2  Eyewitness Female 2 
     Eyewitness Male 2 
3 Police Officer Male 2  Eyewitness Male 2 
 Police Officer Male 2  Eyewitness Female 2 
 Defendant Male 2  Defendant Male 2 
        
4 Police Officer Male 2 10 Eyewitness Female 2 
 Police Officer Male 2  Defendant Male 2 
 Eyewitness Male 2  Police Officer Male 1 
     Police Officer Female 1 
5 Police Officer Male 2     
 Police Officer Male 2 11 Eyewitness Female 2 
     Eyewitness Female 2 
6 Eyewitness Female 2  Police Officer Male 2 
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 Eyewitness Male 2  Defendant Male 2 
 Eyewitness Female 2     
    12 Eyewitness Female 2 
7 Eyewitness Male 2  Eyewitness Female 2 
     Eyewitness Female 2 
 
Note. Under the heading “# of Examinations”, a two (2) indicates that the witness underwent both a direct and cross examination, whereas 
a one (1) indicates that the witness underwent a direct examination only.  
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2.3 Coding 
In addition to the main independent variables of interest outlined above, there 
were various nuisance variables that were recorded. A content dictionary (see Appendix 
B) and coding guide (see Appendix C) were developed based on previous research (e.g., 
Griffiths & Milne, 2006; Snook & Keating, 2010; Snook et al., 2012; Wright & Allison, 
2004) for the coding of utterance types and identifying other relevant information (e.g., 
whether an examination was a direct or cross). 
The number of utterances within each unique examination transcript was coded, 
along with the frequency of utterance types spoken, and the assumed purpose of each 
utterance type. The following nuisance variables were also coded: the assumed gender of 
each lawyer (1 = male vs. 2 = female), the type of witness on the stand (1 = victim, 2 = 
eyewitness, 3 = police officer, 4 = defendant, 5 = character), the assumed gender of each 
witness (1 = male vs. 2 = female), the type of crime the alleged defendant committed (1 = 
person, 2 = property, 3 = hybrid, or 4 = unknown), and the year that the trial took place 
(assigned a numeric value equal to the year; i.e., the year 2013 was entered as 2013).  
The following 13 utterance types were coded (See Appendix B, specifically 
Section 3.1, for additional details about each type): 
Open-ended: These utterances invite the witness to recall answers freely from 
memory. They allow for a wide range of responses, and typically start 
with “tell,” “explain,” or “describe.” For example, “Tell me about the 
argument with your wife” would constitute an open-ended question. 
Probing: These utterances tap into cued recall memory and tend to generate 
answers that are narrower in scope compared to those provided from open-
ended questions. The goal of this type of question is to obtain additional 
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information from the witness. They usually commence with “who,” 
“what,” “why, “where,” “when,” or “how”. An example of a probing 
question would be, “What part of her body hit the ground first?” 
Closed yes-no: These utterances tap into recognition and are typically answered 
with a “yes” or “no” response. An example of a closed yes-no question 
would be, “Did he have his face covered?” 
Leading: This type of utterance suggests/implies an answer to the witness. That is, 
the desired answer is embedded in the question. For example, the question 
“You were drunk, right?” constitutes a leading question. 
Forced Choice: This type of utterance only offers the witness a limited, usually 
two, number of response options. “Did you kick or punch the other 
woman?” would be an example of a forced choice question. 
Opinion: This involves posing a personal opinion or belief to a witness related to 
the allegations before the court. For example, “I think you assaulted Mr. 
Norman” 
would be classified as an opinion. 
Statement: This refers to a statement of fact. This variable is coded for utterances 
that dictate the direction of where the conversation is going, or is a verbal 
declaration that is not in the form of a question.  For example, “Now Ms. 
Thomas, that water is there for you” would be coded as a statement. 
Multiple: This utterance type involves the questioner asking several questions at 
once, without giving the witness a chance to respond after each question. 
An example of this would be, “How did you get there? What did you do 
inside? Did you say anything to him?” 
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Re-asked: This variable is scored if the questioner re-asks a question that the 
witness has already answered at an earlier point in the examination. An 
example of a re-asked utterance would be as follows: “Lawyer: Where did 
you go last night? Witness: Nowhere. I stay home.  Lawyer: Okay, come 
on Fred, where did you go out to last night?” (re-asked question 
emphasized).  
Clarification: In this utterance type, the questioner duplicates or paraphrases the 
answer that the witness has given in order to provide the questioner with a 
better understanding what the witness said. An example of a clarification 
question would be as follows: “Witness: John said he went to a movie. 
Lawyer: Okay, so John went to a movie? Witness: Yes, that’s right.” 
(clarification question emphasized). 
Facilitators: This refers to verbal utterances that encourages the flow of 
conversation, or are said between utterance spoken by someone else (i.e., 
witness, judge, clerk, opposing attorney). For example, “Um-hmm”, 
“Yes”, or “Okay” would be coded as facilitators. 
Not all utterances could be classified into the aforementioned types. As a 
result, the following two types were added to the coding guide (see Appendix B, 
specifically Section 3.1, for additional details and information about each type): 
Command: This refers to a questioner giving a directive or telling the witness to 
do something. For example, utterances like “Just point him out.” or 
“Speak up now” would be examples of commands. 
Incomplete: This is coded when the utterance is not finished being spoken because 
the questioner was interrupted or cut off by another speaker or witness, or 
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because the questioner did not complete the thought. For example: “So, 
how often would you go to –” would be coded as incomplete utterances. 
Additionally, utterances deemed “(inaudible)” or “(unintelligible)” by the 
transcriber are also coded as incomplete. For example: “Okay, and 
(unintelligible).” would also be coded as incomplete. 
The following three purpose types were also coded (see Appendix B, specifically 
Section 4.1, for additional details and information about each type): 
Administrative: This refers to any utterance that is considered to be a procedural 
aspect of the courtroom (i.e., housekeeping matters). It can be legal 
actions or references to any aspect unrelated to the case/charges being 
heard. For example, if the judge or lawyer tells the witness that the 
microphone is not there to amplify their voice, then the purpose type of 
that utterance would be coded as administrative. 
Case Based: This refers to any utterance that is both directly and indirectly related 
to the case being heard. For example, any questions asking about the 
crime, or information leading up to the crime would be scored as case-
based. Importantly, there are two subcategories of case-based utterance 
purposes types that need to be sub-scored. The first subtype is called 
information gathering, and these utterance purpose types target unique 
details of what transpired with respect to the crime. For example, 
“Lawyer: Okay, just describe what happened when you saw the body on 
the floor” would be coded as an open-ended question with an information 
gathering case-based purpose subtype. The second subtype is called 
challenging the accounts/details, and these utterance purpose types occur 
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when the questioner raises points in order to challenge the reliability of the 
witness’ accounts. For example, “Lawyer: Now, at least one officer asked 
you whether you touched her, and at that time you said that you didn’t 
remember.  Now you’re saying you never touched her.  Do you see any 
difference in that?” would be coded as a closed question with a 
challenging the accounts/details case-based purpose subtype. 
Purpose Unknown: This purpose type is to say that the utterance’s purpose does 
not fit into the category of case-based or administrative (as outlined 
above). Typically, purpose unknown is coded for any utterances that have 
been coded as an incomplete or facilitator utterance type. 
2.4 Inter Rater Reliability 
Reliability of the data were measured by having a secondary, independent 
individual code 19 (20.88%) random examination transcripts; eight direct and 11 cross 
examinations. The research assistant underwent training to learn about the practical 
aspects of coding transcripts, the structure and content of the coding guide, and the 
content dictionary. The secondary coder was blind to the expectations of the study. In 
addition, the research assistant practiced coding some examination transcripts (not 
included in the current study sample) prior to commencing the inter rater coding duties. 
The first step for the research assistant was to count the number of identified interlocutor 
utterances (based on the content dictionary) in each unique examination transcript. A 
total of 2,183 utterances were considered in the reliability analysis, and there was 
disagreement on what constituted a complete utterance for only 16 of the utterances.7 The 
agreement between coders, measured using Cohen’s Kappa (Cohen, 1960), for utterance 
(κ = .70) and purpose (κ = .83) types was excellent (Landis & Koch, 1977).  
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Chapter 3: Results 
3.1 Total Utterances 
A total of 8,312 utterances were extracted from the 91 unique examinations. Since 
the sole focus of the study was to analyze lawyers’ questioning practices, a total of 1,039 
utterances were removed because they were spoken by a judge (n = 984), clerk (n = 54), 
or an unidentified speaker (n = 1). An additional 1,116 utterances were removed prior to 
analyses because they were either statements (n = 880), incomplete phrases (n = 173), or 
commands (n = 63) because they were indirectly related to the information-gathering 
process. In other words, 15% of the utterances were not actual questions to witnesses. 
Opinions were retained for analyses because of their inherent objective in the courtroom 
setting is to present their version of the case facts.  
 The number of utterances comprising the final sample was 6,157. When split by 
examination type, 3,106 (50.45%) of the utterances occurred during a direct examination, 
and the remaining 3,051 utterances occurred during the cross examinations. When split 
by lawyer type, 3,459 (56.18%) of the total utterances were spoken by prosecutors, and 
the remaining 2,698 utterances were spoken by defence lawyers. 
3.2 Utterance Types: Descriptive Statistics 
The average number of utterances per examination was 67.66 (SD = 47.99, N = 
91, Range = 14 – 220, 95% CI = 57.67, 77.65). When broken down by lawyer type, the 
mean number of utterances spoken by prosecutors was 72.40 (SD = 43.82), and was 
67.50 (SD = 52.11) for defence lawyers. When broken down by examination type, direct 
examinations contained, on average, 66.09 (SD = 46.36) utterances, and cross 
examinations contained 69.34 (SD = 50.16) utterances.  
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The distribution of utterance types is contained in Table 3, and shown in Figure 1. 
As can be seen, the type of utterance spoken most frequently were closed yes-no 
questions, followed by probing and leading questions. Open-ended questions were the 
third least spoken utterance in all transcripts, having comprised less than one percentage 
of all utterances asked per examination. Taken together, ‘good questions’ (i.e., open-
ended and probing) accounted for 22.03% of all utterances.
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Table 3. Mean Percentage, Standard Deviation, and Confidence Intervals of Utterance Type as a Function of Examination Type and Lawyer Type 
Utterance 
Type 
Mean Percentage 
(N = 91) 
Examination 
 Type 
 Lawyer 
Type 
   
Direct 
(n = 3,106) 
 
 
Cross 
(n = 3,051) 
  
Prosecutor 
(n = 3,459) 
 
Defence 
(n = 2,698) 
 
Closed 
 
28.43 (11.13) 
[26.11, 30.74] 
 
 
32.40 (10.90) 
[29.20, 35.60] 
 
24.18 (9.82) 
 [21.19, 27.17] 
  
30.47 (11.50) 
[27.10, 33.85] 
 
 
26.24 (10.41) 
[23.08, 29.40] 
Probing 21.59 (14.19) 
[18.63, 24.55] 
 
29.39 (13.89) 
[25.31, 33.47] 
13.26 (8.82) 
[10.58, 15.94] 
 22.47 (14.14) 
[18.32, 26.62] 
20.65 (14.35) 
[16.29, 25.01] 
Leading 20.14 (16.00) 
[16.81, 23.47] 
 
10.53 (8.91) 
[7.91, 13.15] 
30.41 (15.55) 
[25.68, 35.14] 
 19.30 (16.28) 
[14.52, 24.07] 
21.05 (15.83) 
[16.23, 25.86] 
Clarification 10.38 (7.54) 
[8.81, 11.95] 
 
7.90 (4.98) 
[6.44, 9.36] 
13.04 (8.87) 
[10.34, 15.73] 
 9.40 (8.48) 
[6.92, 11.89] 
11.43 (6.32) 
[9.50, 13.35] 
Facilitator 9.19 (10.31) 
[7.05, 11.34] 
 
9.22 (10.33) 
[6.18, 12.25] 
9.17 (10.42) 
[6.00, 12.34] 
 7.92 (9.81) 
[5.03, 10.80] 
10.56 (10.77) 
[7.29, 13.83] 
Multiple 7.09 (4.23) 
[6.21, 7.97] 
 
7.07 (3.98) 
[5.90, 8.24] 
7.11 (4.54) 
[5.73, 8.49] 
 6.93 (3.94) 
[5.77, 8.08] 
7.27 (4.56) 
[5.88, 8.65] 
Forced Choice 2.14 (2.83) 
[1.55, 2.73] 
 
2.49 (3.14) 
[1.57, 3.42] 
1.75 (2.42) 
[1.02, 2.49] 
 2.36 (2.65) 
[1.58, 3.13] 
1.90 (3.02) 
[0.98, 2.82] 
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Open-ended 0.44 (0.99) 
[0.23, 0.64] 
 
0.78 (1.27) 
[0.40, 1.15] 
0.07 (.25) 
[0.00, .15] 
 0.51 (1.06) 
[0.20, 0.82] 
0.36 (0.92) 
[0.08, 0.64] 
Re-asked 0.41 (1.12) 
[0.18, 0.64] 
 
0.19 (0.57) 
[0.02, 0.35] 
0.65 (1.47) 
[0.20, 1.09] 
 0.43 (1.32) 
[0.04, 0.82] 
0.39 (0.87) 
[0.13, 0.66] 
Opinion 0.19 (0.82) 
[0.02, 0.36] 
 
0.03 (0.20) 
[0.00, 0.09] 
0.37 (1.14) 
[0.02, 0.71] 
 0.23 (1.02) 
[0.00, 0.53] 
0.16 (0.52) 
[0.00, 0.32] 
Note. The Standard Deviations are contained within the round brackets, while the 95% Confidence Intervals are contained within square brackets. 
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Figure 1. Mean percentage of utterance type, and associated 95% confidence interval per 
examination (N = 91)  
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3.3 Utterance Types: Step-Wise Regression 
A step-wise regression was performed on each of the ten question types using 
eleven predictors. The eleven predictors included: examination type (1 = direct, 2 = 
cross); lawyer type (1 = prosecutor, 2 = defence); lawyer gender (1 = male, 2 = female); 
dummy variables of whether the person on the stand was a victim, eyewitness, police 
officer, defendant, or character (each individual variable, 0 = no, 1 = yes); witness gender 
(1 = male, 2 = female); crime type (1 = person, 3 = hybrid); and year of court case 
(entered as a numeric expression). The correlations between each of the predictors are 
contained in Table 4. As can be seen, there were significantly negative correlations 
between the year that the examination took place and male lawyers (p < .003), and with 
witnesses who were either a victim (p < .001) or a character witness (p < .006). There 
was a significant positive correlation between the year and witnesses who were a police 
officer (p < .018). Crime type was significantly positively correlated with male witnesses 
(p < .002), and witnesses who were a police officer (p < .005) or a defendant (p < .035). 
Crime type, however, was significantly negatively correlated with eyewitnesses (p < 
.006). Prosecuting lawyers were significantly negatively correlated with male lawyers (p 
< .002). Victim witnesses were significantly negatively correlated with both eyewitnesses 
(p < .011) and male witnesses (p < .002). Eyewitnesses were found to be significantly 
negatively correlated with witnesses who were police officers (p < .001), or a defendant 
(p < .002), and male witnesses (p < .001). Police officers were significantly negatively 
correlated with defendants (p < .031), but significantly positively correlated with male 
witnesses (p < .001). Lastly, the defendant was found to be significantly positively 
correlated with male witnesses (p < .009). All other correlations were non-significant. 
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Moreover, the correlation test found that there was no multicollinearity among any of the 
independent variables (all rs < |.67|).     
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Table 4. Correlations between Predictor Variables (N = 91)  
 Year Crime Type Direct Prosecutor Male Lawyer Victim Eyewitness Police Officer Defendant Character 
Crime Type .20 - - - - - - - - - 
Direct .02 -.02 - - - - - - - - 
Prosecutor .02 -.02 .08 - - - - - - - 
Male Lawyer -.32* -.11 .05 -.33* - - - - - - 
Victim -.52* -.18 -.01 -.01 .18 - - - - - 
Eyewitness .04 -.29* -.03 -.03 -.02 -.27* - - - - 
Police Officer .25* .30* .05 .05 -.18 -.17 -.66* - - - 
Defendant .13 .22* -.01 -.01 .09 -.09 -.36* -.23* - - 
Character -.29* -.10 -.01 -.01 .10 -.04 -.15 -.10 -.05 - 
Male Witness .09 .33* .00 .00 -.15 -.34* -.47* .47* .28* .12 
Note. * p < .05 
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The zero-order correlations can be found in Table 5. As can be seen, open-ended 
questions were significantly positively correlated with direct examinations (p < .001). 
Probing questions were significantly negatively correlated with the year that the trial took 
place (p < .016), but were significantly positively correlated with direct examinations (p 
< .001). Closed yes-no questions were significantly positively correlated with direct 
examinations (p < .001), witnesses who were male (p < .016) and witnesses who were 
police officers (p < .035), but were significantly negatively correlated with eyewitnesses 
(p < .019). Leading questions were significantly negatively correlated with direct 
examinations (p < .001). Opinions were significantly negatively correlated with direct 
examinations (p < .048) and defendant witnesses (p < .011). There was also a significant 
negative correlation between multiple questions and eyewitnesses (p < .015), re-asked 
questions and year of trial (p < .007), and also a significant negative correlation with 
clarification questions and direct examinations (p < .002). Facilitators were significantly 
positively correlated with the year that the trial went to court (p < .001) and the type of 
crime that took place (p < .045). All other correlations were non-significant and the 
correlation test showed that there was no multicollinearity among the utterance types and 
independent variables (all rs < |.63|).  
Given the large number of independent variables contained within all of the 
unique transcripts, paired with the fact that there were 10 different dependent variables, a 
Bonferroni’s correction was applied to the significance cut off value in order to reduce 
the chances of Type I error from occurring due to multiple pairwise tests being conducted 
on the data. Therefore, the new alpha value for the regression test was .005 (i.e., α = 
.05/10). 
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Table 5. Zero-Order Correlations between Utterance Type and Predictors (N = 91)  
Utterance Type Year 
 
Crime 
Type 
 
Direct Prosecutor 
Male 
Lawyer 
Victim Eyewitness 
Police 
Officer 
Defendant Character 
Male 
Witness 
Open  .18 .14 .36* .08 .03 -.06 .12 -.10 .02 -.07 -.13 
Probing -.25* .07 .57* .06 .19 .05 .05 -.09 .02 .00 .02 
Closed -.13 -.15 .37* .19 -.16 .01 -.25* .22* -.01 .16 .25* 
Leading .09 -.19 -.62* -.06 -.18 .08 .05 -.16 .09 .02 -.06 
Forced Choice .08 -.01 .13 .08 -.10 .04 -.07 .17 -.12 -.07 -.03 
Opinion .13 -.04 -.21* .04 .03 -.06 -.04 -.10 -.27* -.04 .05 
Multiple .05 .03 -.01 -.04 .11 .14 -.26* .17 .08 -.04 .05 
Re-asked -.29* -.12 -.21 .02 .17 .01 .13 -.09 -.06 -.06 .11 
Clarification -.07 .18 -.34* -.14 .06 -.07 .14 -.03 -.11 -.04 -.10 
Facilitators .36* .21* .00 -.13 .12 -.21 .13 .07 -.08 -.12 -.15 
Note. * p < .05 
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A step-wise regression using the open-ended utterance type as the dependent 
variable revealed that examination type emerged as a significant predictor of open-ended 
questions, F(1, 89) = 13.25, β = -.36, p < .001, R2 = .13. Specifically, lawyers’ tendency 
to use open-ended questions with witnesses on the stand was higher for direct 
examinations. Moreover, as can be seen in Table 3, direct examinations contained 
proportionally more open-ended questions than did cross examination (d = 0.78). 
The step-wise regression analysis using the probing utterance type as the outcome 
variable indicated that two predictors (examination type and year) explained 40% of the 
variance for probing questions, F(2, 88) = 28.93, p < .001. That is, lawyers’ tendency to 
use probing questions with witnesses was higher in direct examinations (β = -.58, p < 
.001), and during earlier years (i.e., cases that went to court further in the past; β = -.27, p 
< .003). As shown in Table 3, direct examinations contained proportionally more probing 
questions than cross examination (d = 1.39). 
The step-wise regression analysis using the closed yes-no utterance type as the 
outcome variable also found examination type to be a significant predictor of closed yes-
no questions, F(1, 89) = 14.23, β = -.37, p < .001, R2 = .14. Direct examinations 
contained proportionally more closed yes-no questions than did cross examinations (d = 
0.79; see Table 3) 
The step-wise regression analysis using the leading utterance type as the 
dependent variable revealed that examination type significantly predicted the use of 
leading questions, F(1, 89) = 56.83, (β = .62, p < .001, R2 = .39. That is, lawyers’ spoke 
proportionally more leading utterances during the cross examinations. Cross 
examinations contained proportionally more leading questions than direct examinations 
(d = 1.57; see Table 3).  
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The step-wise regression analysis with clarification questions as the outcome 
variable found that examination type also predicted the use of clarification questions, as 
well, F(1, 89) = 11.81, p < .002, β = .34, R2 = .12. That is to say, lawyers’ use of 
clarification utterances was higher during cross examinations. Cross examinations 
contained proportionally more clarification utterances than did direct examinations (d = 
0.71; see Table 3).   
The step-wise regression analysis using facilitators as the outcome variable found 
that year emerged as a significant predictor of using facilitators, F(1, 89) = 13.53, β = .36, 
p < .001, R2 = .13. Put differently, lawyers tended to use facilitators more often in case 
that went to court a short time ago (i.e., tried in more recent years).  
All other step-wise regression analyses conducted with the remaining utterance 
types as the outcome variable did not find any other independent variables emerging as 
significant predictors (all ps > .005). 
3.4 Purpose Types: Descriptive Statistics 
In terms of the purpose of each utterance, 89.73% of the utterances were used to 
obtain information relevant to the case (SD = 10.62, 95% CI = 87.52, 91.94). 
Specifically, 87.92% of the total utterances were classified as information gathering (SD 
= 10.51, 95% CI = 85.73, 90.11), and 1.81% were classified as challenging the 
accounts/details of the witness (SD = 3.56, 95% CI = 1.07, 2.55). Only 1.06% of the 
utterances were considered to be administrative in nature (SD = 1.89, 95% CI = 0.67, 
1.45), and 9.21% of the utterances were considered to have an unknown purpose (SD = 
10.33, 95% CI = 7.06, 11.36). 
The distribution of purpose types as a function of examination type and lawyer 
type is shown in Table 6. As can be seen, the most frequent purpose type was information 
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gathering, followed by unknown, challenges, and administrative. Specifically, 
information gathering purposes were found to be proportionally higher in direct (vs. 
cross) examinations, and spoken proportionally more often by prosecutors (vs. defence 
lawyer). Utterances with an unknown purpose were proportionally higher in direct (vs. 
cross) examinations, and spoken proportionally more often by defence lawyers (vs. 
prosecutors). Challenging purposes were proportionally most frequently spoken by 
defence lawyers (vs. prosecutors), and were significantly proportionally higher in cross 
(vs. direct) examinations. Utterances that were administrative in purpose were 
proportionally higher in direct (vs. cross) examinations, and spoken proportionally more 
frequently by prosecutors (vs. defence lawyers).   
 
Table 6. Mean Percentage, Standard Deviation, and Confidence Intervals of Purpose 
Type as a Function of Examination Type and Lawyer Type  
Purpose Type  Examination Type  Lawyer Type 
   
Direct 
(n = 3,106) 
 
 
Cross 
(n = 3,051) 
  
Prosecutor 
(n = 3,459) 
 
Defence 
(n = 2,698) 
 
 
Information 
Gathering 
  
89.25 (10.86) 
[86.06, 92.43] 
 
86.51 (10.06) 
 [83.45, 89.57] 
  
89.18 (9.84) 
[86.29, 92.07] 
 
 
86.58 (11.14) 
[83.20, 89.97] 
Unknown  9.24 (10.36) 
[6.20, 12.28] 
9.17 (10.42) 
[6.00, 12.34] 
 7.94 (9.85) 
[5.05, 10.83] 
 
10.56 (10.77) 
[7.29, 13.83] 
Challenge  .37 (1.30) 
[-.01, .76] 
3.34 (4.48) 
[1.98, 4.70] 
 1.70 (3.45) 
[.69, 2.71] 
 
1.92 (3.71) 
[.80, 3.05] 
Administrative  1.14 (2.06) 
[.54, 1.74] 
.98 (1.71) 
[.46, 1.49] 
 1.18 (1.96) 
[.61, 1.75] 
 
.93 (1.82) 
[.38, 1.49] 
Note. The Standard Deviations are contained within the round brackets, while the 95% 
Confidence Intervals are contained within square brackets.  
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3.5 Purpose Types: Step-Wise Regression 
A step-wise regression was performed on each of the four purpose types using the 
same eleven predictors as outlined above in the Section 3.4. The zero-order correlations 
are shown in Table 7. As can be seen, utterances with an unknown purpose were 
significantly positively correlated with the year that the case went to trial (p < .001) and 
with crime type (p < .043). Administrative purpose types were significantly positively 
correlated with crime type (p < .015), and witnesses who were male (p < .035). 
Information gathering purpose types were significantly negatively correlated with both 
trial year (p < .004) and the type of crime (p < .020). Challenging the account/details of 
the witness were also significantly negatively correlated with direct examinations (p < 
.001), but significantly positively correlated with witnesses who were victims (p < .005). 
All other correlations were non-significant and the correlation test revealed that there was 
no multicollinearity among the purpose types and independent variables (all rs < |.43|). 
Similar to the regression analyses conducted with utterance types, a Bonferroni’s 
correction was applied to the significance cut off value in order to reduce the chances of 
Type I error from occurring given the multiple pairwise tests being conducted on the 
purpose type data. For these analyses, the new alpha value for the regression test was 
.0125 (i.e., α = .05/4). 
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Table 7. Zero-Order Correlations between Purpose Type and Predictors (N = 91)  
Purpose Type Year 
Crime 
Type 
Direct Prosecutor 
Male 
Lawyer 
Victim Eyewitness 
Police 
Officer 
Defendant Character 
Male 
Witness 
Unknown  .36* .21* .00 -.13 .12 -.21 .13 .07 -.08 -.12 -.15 
Administrative  .03 .26* .04 .07 -.14 -.09 -.14 .12 .07 .13 .22* 
Info Gathering -.31* -.25* .13 .12 -.10 .12 -.06 -.02 .00 .08 .11 
Challenge -.16 -.03 -.42* -.03 .03 .30* -.12 -.18 .20 .05 -.01 
Note. * p < .05  
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The regression analysis using the unknown purpose type as the outcome variable 
indicated that two predictors (year and lawyer gender) explained 19% of the variance for 
utterances with an unknown purpose, F(2, 88) = 10.46, p < .001. That is, male lawyers’ 
(10.02%) tended to speak more utterances with an unknown purpose (β = -.26, p < 
.0125), as compared to female lawyers (7.47%); more recent (vs. earlier) court cases also 
tended to have a higher volume of utterances that were identified as having an unknown 
purpose, (β = .45, p < .001).  
The regression analysis that entered information gathering as the dependent 
variable found that the year emerged as a significant predictor of utterances with an 
information gathering purpose, F(1, 89) = 9.317, β = -.31, p < .004, R2 = .10. 
Specifically, lawyers’ tendency to speak utterances for the purpose of gathering details 
more often during court cases that were tried in earlier (vs. more recent) years. 
 The regression analysis using the challenging the accounts/details purpose type 
as the dependent variable revealed that two predictors (examination type and witness 
type) explained 26% of the variance for utterances that were challenging in nature, F(2, 
88) = 15.62, p < .001. Specifically, lawyers tendency to ask more challenging questions 
was higher during cross (vs. direct) examinations, (β = .42, p < .001), and more often to 
victim witnesses (β = .29, p < .003). Cross examinations contained more challenging 
purpose types than direct examinations (d = 0.90), and victims were challenged (5.76%) 
more than the other witness types [eyewitnesses (1.39%), police officers (0.82%), 
defendant (3.79%), and character (3.03%), respectively].  
The regression analysis using the administrative purpose type as the outcome 
variable did not find any other independent variables emerging as being significant 
predictors (all ps > .014). 
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Chapter 4: Discussion 
 The goal of the current study was to quantify the types of questions asked by 
lawyers to witnesses on the stand by examining a sample of court transcripts. This goal 
was achieved by coding each utterance spoken to a witness during the direct and/or cross 
examinations by courtroom questioners. In general, the majority of questions asked by 
lawyers were those that interviewing and questioning experts agree should be avoided 
during an information-gathering interview setting – confirming findings reported in 
previous courtroom questioning studies (e.g., Kebbell et al., 2003, 2004). When 
analyzing the effect of examination type on utterances, many of the similar findings 
observed in previous studies also emerged in the current study (e.g., Kebbell et al., 2003). 
That is, significantly more ‘good’ questions were asked during the direct examinations, 
while significantly more ‘bad’ questions were asked during the cross examinations. 
Moreover, the purpose behind most utterances spoken appears to be for the purpose of 
gathering information. Taken altogether, the findings from the current study provides 
descriptive insights into how well the truth-seeking function of the judiciary process is 
working. At the very least, this study raises some important concerns about the quality of 
the information-gathering process utilized in the Canadian adversarial system. 
4.1 Utterance Types 
The findings observed in the current study suggest that lawyers fail to ask 
questions that allow witnesses to talk and provide information freely. Research suggests 
that open-ended questions (and by extension, probing questions) are the ‘gold standard’ 
for helping witnesses directly and uninhibitedly provide the information themselves 
(Fisher & Geiselman, 1992; Milne & Bull, 1999; Powell, Fisher, & Wright, 2005). Using 
these preferred questions simultaneously protects against the questioner tainting the 
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information – directly or indirectly. This study found that open-ended questions are used 
rarely in the courtroom setting (less than one percent), while approximately one-fifth of 
question asked were probing. Such a finding suggests that lawyers do not follow the 
guidelines of expert interviewers in their quest for obtaining good quality evidence from 
witnesses. Given the strict definition applied to open-ended questions in the current study 
(i.e., open-ended questions were coded only if they met the structure of Tell, Explain, or 
Describe), it is challenging to contrast the present findings with those reported by 
previous research who utilized different questioning definitions. For example, in their 
courtroom studies, both Kebbell and colleagues (2003, 2004), and Zajac and colleagues 
(2003, 2009) provided little detail about the operational definition of exactly what an 
open-ended question entails beyond being questions “that require more than a few words 
to answer” (Kebbell et al., 2003, p. 52) or “does not restrict response options” (Zajac & 
Cannan, 2009, p. S40). Additionally, the in-text examples provided by these researchers 
suggest that their version of open-ended questions encompassed utterance types that the 
current study identifies as probing questions. Furthermore, many of the previous 
courtroom studies did not code for utterances identified as probing. Nevertheless, when 
taken together, the conclusions from this study still echoes that of other researchers: 
questions that allow for open and free recall of information from the witness were used 
infrequently.  
Analyses revealed that nearly 80% of the questions asked are considered to be 
inappropriate and extremely poor for gathering information. In particular, the 
predominate use of closed yes-no questions speaks highly of the control that is being 
exerted by the lawyers over the witnesses. Given that the scope of closed yes-no 
questions are extremely narrow in nature and primarily tap into recognition factors of 
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memory, asking closed yes-no questions in the courtroom setting renders the witness to 
be mainly passive in the information-gathering process, and only allows for limited 
responses. To say differently, the witness is the one who holds the information of interest 
and should be the one mainly involved at producing said information. By imposing 
constraints on the witness via closed yes-no questions, the lawyer is essentially acting as 
the proverbial gatekeeper of the information and witness evidence. Further, since closed 
yes-no questions only require a small limited response, this perpetuates minimal 
information being brought forth onto record rather than full and complete testimony, and 
leaves little room for the witness to elaborate, extend, or explain their answer. In fact, any 
information that does result from a closed yes-no question has been directed by the 
questioner and not by the respondent. Such limiting and narrow scoped questions results 
in the witness only confirming or denying the information provided in the question by the 
lawyer. Closed yes-no utterances have been heavily criticized in the police interviewing 
setting (e.g., Fisher et al., 1987; Griffiths et al., 2011; Snook et al., 2012) as being used as 
a form of witness control. These same criticisms also point out that any information 
obtained via closed yes-no questions is tied directly to the questioner’s request, not only 
casting doubt on where the information originates from in the first place, but also 
bringing into question whose testimony is being given (i.e., the questioner’s or the 
respondent’s).  
Additionally, a large percentage of questions asked were leading. Leading 
questions are perhaps thought of as the ‘worst of the worst’ because the information 
contained in the question itself can create inaccurate responses, and misconstrue any 
information that is gained from asking such a question. Moreover, a wealth of literature 
has identified the major problems associated with leading questions (e.g., Loftus & 
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Palmer, 1974; Loftus & Zanni, 1975; Warren & Lane, 1995). The proportion of leading 
questions in the current study are in line with those reported from Kebbell and colleagues 
(2004), but appear to be less than the results found by other researchers (e.g., Kebbell et 
al., 2003; Zajac et al., 2003; Zajac & Cannan, 2009). It is important to note, however, that 
some previous studies subdivided leading questions into ‘mildly leading’ vs. ‘heavily 
leading’ question types (Kebbell at al., 2003), or were asked to a non-adult group of 
witnesses (i.e., children; Zajac et al., 2003; Zajac & Cannan, 2009). All of the previous 
courtroom studies listed here also categorically assigned one question into a variety of 
utterance types; that is, for example, a question may be coded both as a leading and 
closed question resulting in ‘double-dipping’ of proportions. Such an approach used by 
these previous researchers may account for discrepancies found in leading questions 
between the current and previous findings. Nevertheless, the heavy use of the leading 
questions observed here speaks to another way that lawyers’ exhibit control over the 
witness. By providing information to the witness through the question, lawyers can 
essentially steer the witness evidence toward an outcome favourable for their case, and 
limits the role that the witness plays in providing the information of interest. 
The remaining ‘bad’ utterance types (i.e., clarification, facilitators, multiple, 
forced choice, re-asked, opinion) accounted for one-third of the questions asked to 
witnesses on the stand. As pointed out, a wealth of problems is associated with all of 
these utterance types (e.g., forced choice may only offer limited – perhaps incorrect – 
response options; multiple questions overwhelm witnesses and the respondent may not 
know which question to answer). Granted, the use of these and other poor questioning 
approaches may be strategic and purposeful from the lawyers’ perspective. The maxim 
offered by Evans (1995) suggesting that lawyers should “never ask a question to which 
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[they] do not know the answer” (p. 118) showcases why lawyers are more interested in 
asking limiting and constraining questions to witnesses. The implications of such 
approaches allow the questioner to maintain control of the evidence being elicited. When 
such poor questions are utilized by police interviewers (as shown by numerous formal 
inquires (e.g., FPT Heads of Prosecutions Committee Working Group, 2004), defence 
lawyers cry foul. Clearly, the objectives of officers in the interrogation room versus 
defence lawyers in courtroom might be considered different because the job of a police 
officer is to gather ‘facts’ of an event, while the job of a lawyer is to present the 
possibility of ‘alternative facts’ of the event. Yet, if a certain style of questioning is 
deemed to be inappropriate in one setting according to one group (i.e., poor police 
interviews as said by lawyers), but is considered acceptable in another setting (i.e., 
witness examinations in the courtroom as said by lawyers), it would seem that this is a 
simple case of the proverbial pot calling the kettle black. In other words, the use of poor 
interviewing questions – regardless of the setting – warrants poor evidence quality, and 
should be avoided by all criminal justice questioners.   
When comparing the current study’s results with similar studies in the police 
literature (e.g., Snook & Keating, 2010; Snook et al., 2012), lawyers ask substantially 
more poor questions during their witness examinations than police officers do during 
their witness interrogations. Although the current data show that lawyers appear to ask 
relatively less closed and probing questions than police (28% vs. 40%; 22% vs. 32%, 
respectively), lawyers are noticeably worse at asking open-ended questions (0.5% vs. 
6%), and ask many more leading questions (20% vs. 3%). These comparative findings are 
somewhat intriguing and rather duplicitous when considering that, as mentioned, police 
questioning practices have come under fire by the courts as being a major factor for some 
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recent miscarriages in justice (see Lamer, 2006). The findings in the current study 
suggest that the parties involved in making a case against the police for using poor 
questioning practices (i.e., lawyers) are apparently no better at performing the same task. 
4.1.1 Differences between lawyers. When utterance types are examined by 
lawyer type, the trends of utterances spoken by each lawyer mirrors that observed in the 
overall findings. That is, with the exception of leading questions being asked second most 
frequently for defence lawyers, the most frequently asked utterances are closed yes-no; 
the least frequent being opinions. Regardless of whether the lawyer is sitting at the 
prosecution or defendant’s table, it is highly likely that all lawyers received similar 
training, or rely upon the same guidance tools pertaining to examining a witness on the 
stand. Therefore, it is not surprising that no significant differences emerged for any of the 
utterance types when analyzed by lawyer type. Likewise, lawyer type did not 
significantly predict any of the utterance types. These findings, however, run counter to 
research that has reported differences between prosecutors vs. defence lawyers for 
questions asked to witnesses (Zajac et al., 2003; Zajac and Cannan, 2009). Zajac and 
colleagues (2003) found that defence lawyers asked a greater proportion of leading and 
closed questions, while prosecution lawyers asked a greater proportion of “appropriate 
questions” (p. 206; i.e., likely akin to open-ended and probing questions used in current 
study) to children. However, Zajac and Cannan’s (2009) study contained a sample of 
adult witnesses (being compared to child witnesses), and reported that prosecutors (vs. 
defence lawyers) asked significantly more open-ended and closed questions to adult 
witnesses; defence lawyers reportedly asked more leading questions to adults than 
prosecutors. The discrepancy in the current study’s findings relative to that reported by 
previous research may be due to the way each study operationalized question types, and 
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also due to the fact that utterances in the Zajac and colleagues’ studies could be classed 
into more than one questioning category. The diversity of utterance types employed in the 
current study is also much wider than that of previous studies. It is also possible that 
utterances that were classed into certain categories here (i.e., forced choice) might have 
been classed into a different category (i.e., closed or leading) by other researchers. 
Previous studies appear to have collapsed open-ended and probing questions into one 
category, while the current study separated these into two different utterance types. 
Nevertheless, replication of the current study may render further support of the findings 
reported here. 
4.1.2 Differences between examinations. There were many significant 
differences found for utterance types as a function of examination type, and examination 
type was found to be a significant predictor of many utterance types. Significantly more 
closed yes-no, probing, and open-ended questions were asked during the direct 
examination, while cross examinations contained significantly more leading and 
clarification questions, as well as more offered opinions than direct examinations. These 
findings are both similar and contradictory to the results found by Kebbell and colleagues 
(2003, 2004). In their study, Kebbell et al. reported that significantly more open and 
closed (i.e., akin to the definition of probing utterance type used in the current study) 
were asked during the direct examination, while significantly more yes/no (which is akin 
to the definition of closed yes-no utterance type used in the current study), leading, and 
multiple questions were asked during the cross examination. With the exception of 
multiple utterances having no clear pattern, and closed yes-no questions occurring in the 
opposite direction, all other findings from the current study matched Kebbell et al.’s 
(2003, 2004) reports.  
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Of particular importance was the finding that closed yes-no questions were asked 
more frequently during direct examinations. Given that direct examinations are supposed 
to be relatively open in nature, it is interesting to observe that an utterance type that put 
limits and constraints on the witnesses’ accounts were employed more frequently by 
direct examiners. It may be the case that such an approach is being done purposefully as a 
strategy for exhibiting control over the lawyer’s own witness, thereby regulating the 
quality of information that is being elicited by the witness before the court. Of course, 
regardless of whether the lawyer is acting as the direct or cross examiner, the goal of any 
witness examination is to elicit information favouring one particular side of the argument. 
By asking such constraining questions, the direct examiner may be hedging their bets 
against what sort of information can be tested during the cross examination. However, it 
is important to note that cross examinations still contained a high proportion of closed 
yes-no questions; second only to leading questions. 
The present study also found that clarification utterances were spoken more 
frequently in the cross (vs. direct) examination. With the exception of previous police 
interview studies (e.g., Snook et al., 2012), no other courtroom studies appear to have 
coded for this particular utterance type. This observed finding may be due to the fact that 
cross examiners are attempting to persuade the triers of fact to side with their version of 
events by ensuring certain answers are repeated. Bringing attention to an answer by 
repeating it ensures that the triers of fact involved in the case have undoubtedly heard the 
testimony. Moreover, it would be to the cross examiner’s advantage to ensure that 
incriminating testimony is repeated multiple times. Such testimony evidence will be a 
major factor when the verdict decision has to be made based on the evidence presented. 
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The two largest effects were found for probing and leading utterance types, and in 
opposite direction to one another. Finding that more probing utterance were spoken in the 
direct (vs. cross) examination is not entirely surprising since these questions help achieve 
the goal of the direct examination in obtaining information in a relatively open nature. 
The relative lower use of probing questions during the cross examination is likely due to 
the fact that the cross examiner can only ask questions about information brought up in 
the direct (and this information has likely come from the direct examiners heavy use of 
probing and closed yes-no questions observed here). Likewise, the large use of leading 
questions in the cross (vs. direct) examination is because the cross examiners are 
attempting to suggest an alternative explanation for the case at hand. Although leading 
questions are thought by interviewing experts as the bane of all question types, courtroom 
experts recognize the leading question as one of the main tenant and strength of a cross 
examination. As a British Queen’s Council put it, “[direct examination] is where the 
witness gives the evidence… [but] cross examination is where I give the evidence and the 
witness says ‘yes’ or ‘no’” (as quoted in Henderson et al., 2016, p. 181). 
The best type of question to ask (i.e., open-ended) was found to be spoken more 
frequently during the direct examination, as compared to the cross examination. Although 
this is an encouraging finding, it is important to keep in mind that the proportion of open-
ended questions asked during the direct examination is still minuscule. Over 6,000 
utterances were coded in this study, and only 29 were identified as open-ended. 
Specifically, 24 of these were asked during a direct examination while only five were 
asked during a cross examination. Such a lack of use of the premier utterance type during 
a truth-seeking process would likely be viewed by some as abhorrent, and suggests that 
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courtroom questioners are being aberrant when it comes to adhering to best questioning 
practices.  
Despite the reported findings here, a recent study comparing historic (circa 1950-
1959) and contemporary (circa 1996-2011) courtroom questioning practices suggests that 
prosecuting lawyers appear to be improving their questioning practice over time by way 
of asking more open-ended questions in recent court cases (see Westera et al., 2017). 
Such a finding is encouraging and suggests that prosecutors are starting to adhere to the 
evidence identifying open-ended questions as the best information gathering questions. 
However, it should be noted that Westera et al.’s version of an open-ended question is 
more in line with the definition of a probing question used in the current study. 
Unfortunately, Westera and colleagues also found no change in the approach taken by 
lawyers during the cross examination. They found that the most frequently spoken 
utterance type by the cross examiner is still leading questions. 
4.2 Purpose Types 
One of the more encouraging findings from the current study is that the greatest 
proportion of questions asked to witnesses were found to be for the purpose of gathering 
information; nearly ninety percent of the utterances were dedicated to this purpose. At the 
very least, such a finding suggests that courtroom questioners are focusing their pursuits 
toward gathering relevant information for the case, but this finding needs to be 
considered in light of the types of questions being asked to achieve this purpose. As 
noted, the vast majority of information gathering utterances were still found to be those 
identified as poor questioning approaches. To say differently, most of the question types 
asked (e.g., closed, leading) are those that produce less accurate and reliable information. 
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To that effect, despite the main purpose of asking questions to be for gathering 
information, the information may still be questionable in and of itself. 
4.2.1 Differences between lawyers. No significant differences were found for 
any of the purpose types when broken down by lawyer type. Although no studies appear 
to have explored the assumed purpose behind each utterance spoken in the courtroom, 
one of the question categories proposed by Zajac and Cannan (2009) coded for 
credibility-challenging aspects of lawyers questioning, and might be comparable to the 
challenge purpose type used in the present study. In the current study, a challenge 
purpose type was defined as when the questioner raises points in order to test the 
reliability of the witness’ accounts. Zajac and Cannan, however, identified their 
credibility-challenging question category in one of two ways: The first subtype of 
credibility-challenging questions (i.e., CR1; see Zajac & Cannan, 2009) was defined as 
those that suggested that the witness had poor memory or confusion (e.g., “Do you think 
that he maybe had touched you on your leg but you mistook it for your backside?”), 
referred to alcohol or drugs (e.g., “The fact that you can’t remember is because you’d had 
a quite a lot of wine to drink hadn’t you?”) , or questioned the certainty of the witness 
(e.g., “Are you sure about that?”). The second subtype (i.e., CR2; see Zajac & Cannan, 
2009) was defined as questions that suggested the witness was lying or being untruthful 
(e.g., “I suggest to you that you are making this whole thing up.”), involved repetition of 
the question or answer (similar to the clarification utterance type in the current study; 
e.g., Question – “Who was there at that stage?” Answer – “They were all there.” 
Question – “All of them?”), referred to delayed disclosure (e.g., “Why didn’t you tell 
your mum at the time?”), referred to a positive relationship with the accused (e.g., 
“Haven’t you always been quite affectionate toward your Uncle [X] and always gave him 
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a big hug before going to bed?”), or referred to other witnesses (e.g., “[X] is going to give 
evidence and he will say…”). In their study, Zajac and Cannan (2009) reported that 
defence lawyers asked more CR1 type of credibility-challenging questions to 
complainants than prosecutors. Moreover, defence lawyers also asked more CR2 type of 
credibility-challenging questions to both children and adults than prosecution lawyers. It 
might be the case that the use of a broader operational definition of “a challenge” might 
have led to differences as a function of lawyer type.  
4.2.2 Differences between examinations. Significantly more utterances with a 
challenging purpose were spoken in the cross (vs. direct) examination. This is an 
expected finding given that the one of the main principles of a cross examination is to 
contest the testimony given during the direct examination. Unfortunately, Zajac and 
Cannan (2009) did not specifically analyze their findings in terms of the examination 
type, so no comparison with previous literature is possible. However, one of the more 
interesting findings within this analysis revealed that witnesses who were alleged victims 
(as compared to the other witness types) received the brunt of the challenging utterances. 
This finding is in line with reports given in previous work. For example, Zajac and 
Cannan (2009) reported that complainants (i.e., likely akin to victims in the current study) 
received more credibility-challenging questions (i.e., CR1 and CR2) from the defence, as 
compared to the prosecuting lawyers. Additionally, although Kebbell and colleagues 
(2003) did not test for whether questions asked to witnesses were challenges, they did 
report that complainants were asked significantly more questions in the cross 
examination when compared to the questions that defendants were asked during the direct 
examination. Taken together, the current findings paired with some previous studies 
suggests that victims will experience a far worse task on the stand than other witness 
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types. This is an alarming concern since victims are often the people that come forward to 
make the complaint and may actually be scared off to do so, especially when the 
treatment of victims on the stand (by way of challenges) may be unnerving for them.  
4.3 Proposal of Better Courtroom Questioning  
While the trends offered by the Westera et al. (2017) study appear to be headed in 
the preferred direction, they did not offer a solution to the concern about courtroom 
questioners using poor questions for gathering information. In the not so distant past, 
police officers were challenged with this same issue and have implemented a change in 
practice and policy for conducting interviews with witnesses (e.g., PEACE; see Milne & 
Bull, 1999; Snook et al., 2014). In the same way that officers have changed their 
interviewing practices, it is possible that lawyers can also make the same valuable 
changes to their questioning practices, and still conduct thorough courtroom 
examinations of witnesses. The crux of the judicial process hinges on the evidence and 
facts presented in court, and much of this evidence is testimony. While much of the 
evidence presented in court comes from witnesses, other courtroom evidence may be 
available in the form of video footage, DNA analysis, or testimony reported by a 
multitude of others. Much akin to the new approach that police officers take in their 
interview, the existing evidence is used to support, counter, or challenge any of the 
statements given by witnesses. It is possible for lawyers to take a note from the changes 
in the police world and apply them to their setting. That is, by asking the preferred types 
of questions (i.e., open-ended) during the direct and cross examinations, but utilizing the 
evidence of the case to challenge the testimony at any point.  
Consider the following example to illustrate: Assume the direct examination 
lawyer wants to elicit evidence about a man’s description. Instead of asking a closed 
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(e.g., “Did he have a coat on?”) or probing (e.g., “What was he wearing?”) question, a 
better approach would be to ask an open-ended question (e.g., “You said you saw a man, 
describe him for me”). Rather than limiting the witness’ response to a simple ‘yes’ or 
‘no’, or by narrowing their scope to focus only on what the man was wearing, asking an 
open-ended question removes the lawyer from contaminating memory and can possibly 
provide new information. Such limiting questions (e.g., closed and probing) only allow 
for confirmation of the information encapsulated in the question (i.e., the outfit of the 
man). However, in addition to providing clothing details – essentially what the other two 
utterance types are tapping into – a response to an open-ended question might yield 
information about the man’s ethnicity, hair length/colour, accessories (e.g., glasses, 
knapsack), or even if the person is a man at all. When it comes time for the opposing 
lawyer to cross examine the witness, the lawyer is still allowed to follow the rules 
outlined by the court for testing the credibility of the direct testimony, but can achieve 
this goal via the best questioning practices with the available evidence (e.g., “You said in 
your direct testimony that the man had a jean jacket, but we have CCTV footage of the 
man wearing a rain jacket. Explain that to me.”). 
Proponents who endorse standard questioning practices of lawyers will no doubt 
object to the proposal offered here. Critics may try to make the case that lawyers are 
allowed to ask these ‘bad’ types of questions because it is their job to represent their 
client well and by all means necessary. Furthermore, the current rules of engagement in 
the courtroom allow for such poor questioning practices to occur (e.g., leading questions 
during the cross examination). Yet, if this same logic was applied to the police setting – 
who arguably have the job of representing the community – then a new question about 
the justice system needs to be addressed: why is it acceptable to call foul on the police for 
LAWYERS’ QUESTIONING PRACTICES 
 
71 
 
asking bad questions, but it is viewed as a necessary evil by lawyers to do their job? Such 
a question may lead to a philosophical debate as to what exactly justice is and how it is 
achieved, and is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, the abundance of literature 
that recognizes the concern that questioning has on memory is alarming enough, and 
regardless who is asking the questions (police officer vs. lawyer), contamination of 
memory is a real possibility – especially with leading and closed questions. 
4.4 Limitations and Future Directions 
 4.4.1 General limitations. The reported findings presented in the current study 
need to be considered in light of some limitations. The generalizability of lawyer 
questioning practices is bounded to the fact that all lawyers in the current sample are 
practicing in the province of Newfoundland and Labrador. Due to this fact, to claim that 
this sample represents all Canadian lawyers is a stretch. It would have been more 
preferable to have used a larger sample and cross section of Canadian lawyers for 
conducting the question analyses, however, due to logistical constraints related to coding 
and number of data files available, analyses and subsequent conclusions had to be 
conducted with the current data set. Although the trends presented in this paper would 
likely remain the same, future studies should purposefully target a larger and broader 
sample (of both transcripts and unique lawyers) in order to provide a more complete 
picture of courtroom questioning practices. 
A more important limitation lies with the quality of the dataset itself. All findings 
are based from transcribed archival data that was provided digitally (i.e., as Microsoft 
Word document files) to the author. Without having access to the audio recorded files 
from the court session, there is no way to test the accuracy of the transcription. Granted, 
minor spelling and grammatical errors are of no real concern considering the goal of the 
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present study. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that any major transcription mistakes 
would derail the general findings reported here. According to a clerk at the trial division 
courtroom office, all transcriptions of the cases used in the present study were transcribed 
by a variety of people. Assumedly, all transcribers adhered to the rules of transcription 
when formulating the word file documents, but this information (i.e., transcription 
consistency) was not provided. Nevertheless, if one could check the reliability of the 
transcription quality with the original audio recordings, then the confidence of the 
reported findings would only be strengthened.  
Given the nature of working with transcribed documents, other valuable and 
informative pieces of information (e.g., pragmatic elements; see Gibbons, 2003) that may 
have enlightened the coding process are missing. For instance, the tone in which 
questions were asked to witnesses (e.g., yelling in anger, being sarcastic or empathic to 
witness) is unavailable. Similarly, the state of the witness on the stand (e.g., being hostile, 
crying) is also not fully captured in transcription; it is possible that certain responses from 
the witness may inform follow-up questions from the lawyer. Although one may be able 
to guess at the tone of the questions asked (or the state of the witness) based on the 
transcribed words alone, the true mood/intention behind the lawyers’ questions (and 
witnesses’ answers) cannot be accurately determined. Moreover, other confounding 
social context effects (e.g., body language or other physical motions related to the 
questions/responses; Gibbons, 2003) exhibited either by the lawyer or the witness are not 
able to be captured due to the format of the current dataset. In everyday normal 
conversational settings, context effects are important elements that assist the flow of 
conversation. Thus, in more serious settings such as the courtroom whereby 
consequential outcomes are at play, such context effects are a central element to 
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encapsulate when gathering legally binding information and evidence. Such physical 
motions, language, or actions (if existing in the court transcripts analyzed here) may 
influence or inform the line of questioning that a lawyer decides to take with the witness. 
Future studies may want to consider replicating the current study and utilize the court 
proceeding’s audio (or video, if available) recordings to help inform question coding 
decisions. At the very least, hearing (and seeing) the verbal gestures can add another 
element not being tapped by the current study.  
4.4.2 Design limitations. One design concern is the slight dependency issue 
within the analyses. That is to say, most of the lawyers in the current study conducted 
multiple examinations, and may have possibly influenced the trends observed here. 
However, it is important to note that each examination was conducted with a different 
witness on the stand, and different questioning approaches may have been used. It would 
have been ideal to have each examination conducted by a different lawyer; however, the 
logistics of the data collection prohibited this more intensive process. Clearly, it is 
important that replications of this study should aim to gather a wider, more diverse 
dataset to test the strength of the conclusions found herein.   
Given the quasi-experimental design of this study, no control could be applied to 
the availability of documented evidence in possession of each lawyer for all of the 
different court cases. The amount or magnitude of available evidence may have impacted 
the choice of questions used during witness examination. Perhaps the lawyers whom had 
limited external evidence favouring their case elected to use more narrowly-focused 
questions (e.g., closed, leading) during witness examinations in an effort to control the 
testimonial facts presented before the court. Future researchers may want to selectively 
choose court cases that are more closely alike (i.e., similar type of crime, similar 
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available evidence) in order to parse out any effects that available documented evidence 
is rendering.  
The design also did not allow control of various other characteristic factors related 
to the courtroom players. For example, the number of years that each lawyer had been 
practicing law was not available for analysis, and could be an extraneous variable related 
to question choices. It is logical to assume that lawyers with more years of practice may 
be better at formulating questions to witnesses compared to less experienced lawyers. 
Thus, the question remains as to whether a lawyer cohort effect may inform some of the 
current findings; although this is unlikely, researchers could easily test this inference by 
way of a simple comparison of lawyers’ experience (i.e., having more vs. less experience 
practicing law). Furthermore, there is absolutely no way to control for the answers given 
by any of the witnesses on the stand. The answers to certain questions previously asked 
may very well inform the examiner’s choice for any follow-up questions.  
Another factor that may impact the lawyers’ questioning practices is the 
courtroom environment itself. All of the cases analyzed here were tried by judge-alone 
and had a limited number of courtroom players involved (e.g., judge, lawyers, defendant, 
witness, and clerk). Perhaps including the presence of a jury may render a slight change 
in question choices. Since a jury plays a key role in the outcome of the trial, lawyers have 
an added element to consider when planning their questioning process. In a jury trial, 
lawyers not only need to ask certain questions in order to elicit the desired information 
from the witness on the stand, but also need to be able to use this information and 
questioning procedure to paint a certain story to the jury. Much research has 
demonstrated that jurors rely on a story model when making their verdict decisions (e.g., 
Pennington & Hastie, 1986, 1988). Analyzing questioning practices with the presence of 
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a jury may result in lawyers using better or worse types of questions, however, this 
remains to be seen.  
4.4.3 Future studies. The current study provided important information with 
respect to the questioning practices in the courtroom, particularly focusing on lawyers’ 
questions to witnesses on the stand. Future studies may also want to explore the 
questioning practices of judges to witnesses. In a criminal bench trial, it is not uncommon 
for a judge to ask questions to the witness during the trial. Based on advocacy practices 
recommended to lawyers in many texts (e.g., Evans, 1995; Glissan, 1991; Stone, 1995; 
Wellman, 1997), lawyers ask certain questions for the purpose of gaining evidence that 
favours their case. A judge, however, is considered to be the unbiased party of the law 
and makes the verdict decision based on the evidence (both external and witness 
testimony) presented in court. Judges also have the right to further examine the witness 
by way of questions after the direct and cross examiners have completed their questions. 
Granted, intervening questioning from the judge should be a rarity, but it sometimes a 
necessity in order to ensure a complete understanding of the testimonial evidence, 
expedite the trial process, and to further probe for information that they feel is important 
in rendering a justified verdict (see Hobgood, 1981). Initially, it may be expected that 
judges are no better than lawyers at asking questions to witnesses given their background 
as a previously practicing lawyer. Although no empirical studies appear to have explored 
the questioning practices of judges to witnesses on the stand directly, evidence from other 
related in-court questioning (e.g., jury selection) suggests that jurors are more likely to 
provide honest and candid answers when questioned by a judge, as compared to being 
questioned by an attorney, because of the perception that the judge is an authority figure 
(see Lieberman & Sales, 2007). Yet, other commentators suggest that the increased social 
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distance between the juror and judge may reduce disclosure from a potential juror (Suggs 
& Sales, 1980). Although the juror selection findings summarized here provides no 
support for whether judges will ask more appropriate information-gathering questions to 
witnesses, the fact that the potential jurors answer differently to a judge suggests that 
judges’ questions may be different from lawyers. At the very least, an analysis of 
courtroom questioning practices of judges to witnesses is called for in both adversarial 
and inquisitorial models of justice. 
As noted during the review of literature in the current paper, analyses of police 
and lawyer questioning practices have been conducted in many commonwealth and 
European countries (e.g., Canada [Snook & Keating, 2010; Snook et al., 2012; Wright 
and Alison, 2004]; UK [Andrews & Lamb, 2016; Baldwin, 1992a, 1992b; Milne & Bull, 
1999; Kebbell & Johnson, 2000; Kebbell et al., 2003, 2004]; Norway [Myklebust & 
Alison, 2000]; Australia [Westera et al., 2017]; and New Zealand [Zajac & Cannan, 
2009; Zajac et al., 2003]). Future researchers may also be interested in examining the 
questioning practices of lawyers from Asian countries or collectivistic cultures. A recent 
study that examined police interviewing styles in Japan reported comparable findings – 
although with slight variations – to those conducted in English-speaking European 
countries (see Wachi et al., 2014). It would be interesting to see if similar parallels 
observed in the current study (i.e., Canadian lawyers are less effective than Canadian 
police officers in the interview setting) were found in other international studies, as well. 
A notion proposed in this paper is that thorough courtroom examinations can still 
be conducted while adhering to and using what the interview literature refers to as best 
practice questioning approaches. If lawyers agreed to gather evidence via open-ended 
questions, the question still remains on the impact of the witness evidence obtained 
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during trial. Would the evidence be better or worse? What impact would asking open-
ended questions have for strengthening or weakening each lawyers’ case? Future studies 
could test these and other remaining questions in mock-trial laboratory based studies, 
controlling for the factors mentioned above and the types of questions asked to witnesses 
on the stand. 
4.5 Concluding Thoughts  
 By applying the same qualifier as Wright and Alison (2004), this study does not 
aim or pretend to be decisive, nor should any of the conclusions drawn from the results 
observed here accurately represent the questioning practices of all Canadian lawyers. 
Given that the present study is relatively exploratory in nature, the analyses should – at 
the very least – represent an important first step toward determining whether Canadian 
lawyers are asking questions to witnesses that facilitate the most reliable and accurate 
information. 
 In fact, it may be premature to reprimand the lawyers for such findings when they 
are well within their rights, as deemed by the courts, to examine witnesses in the present 
form. Perhaps a more central issue may be educating judges about the dangers that the 
current questioning approaches poses for seeking the truth and administering justice. 
Beyond judges, the current policy in the adversarial system may need to be revisited and 
amended in order to protect everyone involved in the justice process – from the police 
officers who conduct the initial investigations to the witnesses on the stand being 
questioned by lawyers. The best way to ensure that the people in our communities are 
protected, and justice is served, is to use evidence-based practices to guide our legal 
system. 
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Footnotes 
1 It should be noted, however, that some researchers (e.g., Goodworth, 1979; Shepard, 
2007) have lumped the 5WH questions in with the TED questions (i.e., collectively 
classed as open-ended questions), while others (e.g., Loftus, 1982; Milne & Bull, 1999) 
suggest that 5WH questions are better thought of as a closed-specific question type. For 
the purpose of this study, the author agrees with the viewpoint proposed by Griffiths and 
Milne (2006) and regards the 5WH questions as being different (in purpose and form) 
from the TED questions. 
 
2 Some scholars (e.g., Griffiths & Milne, 2006) categorically lump and subdivide 
appropriate closed yes-no questions together with open-ended and probing questions (i.e., 
as “good” question types) by arguing that closed questions are appropriate when the 
interview process is almost finished (i.e., coming to a “close”).  
 
3 In their study, Wright & Alison (2004) used the terms ‘closed identification’ for probing 
questions and ‘closed selection’ for forced choice questions. To limit confusion between 
study comparisons, the author has chosen to place the question type 
terminology/language defined in the current study in parenthesis, where appropriate. 
Despite Wright and Alison (2004) using different terms to identify question types, the 
structure of their defined questions match that outlined in the Snook and colleagues 
(2010, 2012) studies, and the current study.  
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4 Some literature uses the term ‘examination-in-chief’ instead of ‘direct examination’. 
Both terms refer to the same procedural concept. For the purpose of this paper, the term 
direct examination is used throughout. 
 
5 However, according to some commentators, there is very little empirical support for 
whether direct examinations are truly conducted in an open nature or friendly approach 
(see Kebbell et al., 2003, 2004). 
 
6 Further examination of the witness beyond the direct and cross examinations is possible. 
Any additional follow-up questions would be conducted as re-direct examination or re-
cross examinations. All of the rules of engagement that applied to the direct and cross 
examinations apply for the follow-up examinations, respectively. See Evans (1995) for 
additional explanation. 
 
7 Cohen’s Kappa could not be calculated for the number of utterances. This was because 
the author’s decision of labelling utterances always resulted in a constant. In other words, 
the author always said ‘yes’ to whether a phrase in the transcript was a constant. Thus, 
the utterance decisions being made by the secondary, independent inter rater were always 
being compared to the same constant. See Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) for an 
explanation related to this issue. 
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Appendix A – Sample Examination 
Note. The identifying information (e.g., names, crime type) of all people in the following 
transcript is fake and for illustrative purposes only. The utterance number is bolded in 
brackets before each testimony question. The coded utterance type is bolded and 
underlined in parenthesis after the question utterance, and the coded purpose type is 
italicized within the same parenthesis separated by a dash (–). ‘Q.’ indicates the question 
being asked and ‘A.’ indicates the witness’ response to the question. 
 
MS. COURTNEY LEITMAN, SWORN, XX’D BY MR. PARSONS 
 
(1) MR. PARSONS:  Just a couple of quick questions for you, Ms. Leitman.  So you 
indicated that it’s initially pretty much at your insistence that Ms. Coogan went to 
the police to report what she’s alleging here today? (Leading – Case Based: 
Information Gathering)  A.  I told her that she needed to think about it. 
(2) Q. Right, and initially she was somewhat reluctant to do so? (Leading – Case Based: 
Information Gathering) A.  She was scared. 
(3) Q. Okay.  You also indicated that you had observed some texts on Ms. Coogan’s 
telephone? (Leading – Case Based: Information Gathering)  A.  Yes. 
(4) Q. At any stage did you notice Ms. Coogan editing the contents of what might have 
been on her telephone? (Closed – Case Based: Information Gathering)  A.  No.  I 
have the same phone, and I don’t think that’s possible. 
(5) Q. Okay, what about deleting messages, did you see anything like that? (Closed – 
Case Based: Information Gathering)   A.  No, I did not. 
(6) Q. Okay. So Ms. Coogan stayed the night at your house and then – (Incomplete – 
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Purpose Unknown) A.  Yes. 
(7) Q. You guys – you didn’t go to work together, that’s correct, is it? (Leading – Case 
Based: Information Gathering) A.  Yes, but she drove me to work in her vehicle. 
(8) Q. Okay, do you recall what time her shift started that day? (Closed – Case Based: 
Information Gathering) A.  It was a day shift as well.  She started maybe half an 
hour, or an hour after me. 
(9) Q. Okay, and was there any point during that day that you guys were apart from one 
another for any extended period of time? (Closed – Case Based: Information 
Gathering) A.  No.  Actually that’s why she went to work, she didn’t want to be 
alone. 
(10) MR. PARSONS:  Just give me one second here.  Those are the only questions I had 
for you.  Thank you. (Statement – Administrative) 
(11) MS. WENDELL:  Nothing on re-direct.  Thank you. (Statement – Administrative) 
(12) THE COURT:  You’re free to go, Ms. Leitman.  Thank you very much. (Statement 
– Administrative) 
 
(WITNESS EXCUSED) 
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Appendix B – Transcript Coding Guide Dictionary 
Section 1: Case Characteristics 
Case Number: The numeric code assigned to the case given by the court. This 
code is found on the Detailed Report Summary (Main White Binder). 
Year: The year that the case went before the Supreme Court of Newfoundland 
and Labrador. This is indicated by the first four numbers in the Case Number or is 
timestamped within the original main transcript. When coding the year, it is preferable to 
use the year that the current case is heard before the court. For example, if the case 
number is 20090T12345, but has a timestamp within the original main transcript of 
September 21, 2013, then use ‘2013’ as the year. 
Crime Type: This is the type of crime that has occurred. Person refers to crimes 
against an individual(s) and include, but are not limited to: uttering threats, harassment, 
kidnapping, stalking, rape, assault, aggravated assault, indecent assault, sexual assault, 
hate crimes, domestic violence, and murder. Property refers to crimes against property 
and include, but are not limited to: break and enter, burglary, arson, theft, shoplifting, 
larceny, vandalism, property damage, embezzlement of money, identity theft, and 
extortion. Hybrid refers to a combination of the two types and include, but are not limited 
to: fraud, prostitution, robbery, public intoxication, drug trafficking, drunk driving. 
Unknown refers to a code where the crime type cannot be determined based on the 
details within the transcripts. Crime Type is coded based on details within the court 
transcripts.  
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Section 2: Transcript Characteristics 
Transcript Number: The numeric code assigned to the transcript for each unique 
question session within a specific case.  
Examination Type: The type of examination being conducted to the witness on 
the stand. Direct Examination is when a witness is being interviewed by the lawyer who 
called the witness to testify, and this examination type can be identified at the top of the 
transcript by an “X’d” (e.g., “Mr. Bob Loblaw, Sworn, X’d by Ms. Erika Weaver”). 
Cross Examination is when a witness on the stand is being interviewed by the opposing 
lawyer, and can be identified at the top of the transcript by an “XX’d” (e.g., “Mr. Bob 
Loblaw, XX’d by Ms. Erika Weaver”).  
Questioner ID: This is a unique number assigned to each questioner as a way to 
anonymously identify each court official. See the identification list contained within the 
Main White Binder to match the correct ID to the questioner.  
Questioner Type: Refers to the type of court official leading the examination of 
the witness on the stand, and can be found either in the Detailed Report summary or 
through reading details within the court transcript. The Crown lawyer(s) represents Her 
Majesty the Queen. The Defence lawyer(s) represents the defendant. 
Questioner Gender: This is the assumed gender of the questioner, as determined 
by information provided on the Detailed Report summaries (Big White Binder), and/or 
through details found during readings of the transcripts (i.e., name, pronouns used). 
 Witness ID: This is a unique number assigned to each witness on the stand. See 
the identification list contained within the Main White Binder to match the correct ID to 
the witness. 
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Witness Type: Refers to the type of witness on the stand under examination by 
the Questioner. The Victim is someone who allegedly suffered from a criminal act. This 
information is gathered by through details found during readings of the transcripts. An 
Eyewitness is a person who observed the crime in question, or is connected to the crime 
in question (e.g., the mother of a victim), and has some form of person evidence in 
support of either the complainant or defendant. A Police Officer refers to any witnesses 
who were part of the investigation process and are testifying with respect to their role. 
For example, a police officer may be the person who has arrested the suspect, or someone 
who has taken pictures of the crime scene. The Defendant is someone who is alleged to 
have committed the crime that is in question before the court. Often, the defendant can be 
identified by the name on the case name. For example, R. vs. Bob Loblaw indicates that 
Mr. Loblaw is the defendant. This detail can also be confirmed through readings of the 
transcripts. An Expert is someone who is called before the court to testify based on 
having extensive education or training in a particular subject. For example, a medical 
doctor may be considered an expert witness because they are testifying about medical 
aspects related to the case, or a police officer may be testifying in their role as an expert 
finger print identifier. When coding the witness type, specify the type of expert (e.g., 
Doctor, Police Officer, Academic Researcher). A Character witness is someone called 
before the court to vouch for another person involved in the court proceedings (e.g., 
victim, accused). Generally, Character witnesses were not present at the duration of the 
crime. Friends, family, or clergy might be examples of character witnesses in a court 
proceeding. 
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Witness Gender: This is the assumed gender of the witness, as determined by 
information provided on the Detailed Report summaries (Big White Binder), and/or 
through details found during readings of the transcripts (i.e., name, pronouns used). 
 
Section 3: Utterance/Question Types and Frequencies 
Frequency: The number of times that each utterance or question occurred during 
the examination between the time that the witness is sworn on the stand and when the 
witness has answered all the questions from the questioner (this is typically identified 
within the transcript when the questioner states that they have no further questions and/or 
the witness is excused from the witness stand). Additionally, the witness may be asked to 
step off of the stand during the middle of the examination so the court officials (i.e., 
judge and lawyers) can converse without having the witness present. Typically, this is 
identified within the transcripts by “(Witness Aside)”. Any utterances or questions that 
occur while the witness is not on the stand are ignored, and therefore not counted or 
coded. It is only after the witness has returned to the stand (as indicated in the transcript) 
that the next utterance or question is coded. 
 
Section 3.1: Question/Utterance Definitions 
Open-ended: These questions invite the witness to recall answers freely from 
memory. They allow for a wide range of responses, and typically start with “tell,” 
“explain,” or “describe.” For example, “Tell me about the argument with your wife” 
would constitute an open-ended question. Cueing the witness before the question is still 
only coded as open (i.e., cued open / invitation). For example, “You said you went to the 
movies last night (cue), tell me about the film (open)”. 
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IMPORTANT NOTE: For any questions that contain open language (“tell”, 
“explain”, “describe”), but are not presented as an invitation to the witness are not coded 
as Open. Rather, in most cases (depending on the structure of the question), the question 
will be coded as a Closed. For example, “Can you tell us about your relationship with 
your wife?” contains open language (i.e., tell), but is structured in the form of a Closed 
question (i.e., Can you…).  
SECONDARY NOTE: When situations like the example above arise, code the 
questions as the appropriate structure, however, please flag these locations in the 
transcript in the SPSS file. The purpose of doing this is to re-consider these question 
types during data analysis. It is possible that witnesses may interpret a “Can you tell us...” 
(closed) question as being an open invitation, despite the structure of the question being 
in the form of a Closed question. 
Probing: These questions tap into cued recall memory and tend to generate 
answers that are narrower in scope compared to those provided from open-ended 
questions. The purpose of this type of question is to obtain additional information. They 
usually commence with “who,” “what,” “why, “where,” “when,” or “how” (5WH). An 
example of a probing question would be, “What part of her body hit the ground first?” 
Note: Sometime the 5WH prompts are omitted by the questioner (e.g., “Your address?” 
as compared to “what’s your address?”), however, the question is still coded as probing. 
Cueing the witness before the question is still only coded as probing. For example, “You 
said you went to the movies last night (cue), what movie did you see? (probing)”. 
Closed Yes/No: These questions tap into recognition and are typically answered 
with a “yes” or “no” response. Some examples of a closed yes/no question would be, 
“Did he have his face covered?” or “Do you remember what day of the week it was?” or 
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“Was anyone there?” or “Would you recognize him today?” Cueing the witness before 
the question is still only coded as closed. For example, “You said you went to the movies 
last night (cue), did you buy a ticket? (closed)”. 
Leading: This type of question suggests/implies an answer to the witness. That is, 
the desired answer is embedded in the question. For example, the question “You were 
drunk, right?” constitutes a leading question. There is no indication prior to the question 
being asked that the information was alluded to by the witness. Cueing the witness before 
the question is still only coded as leading. For example, “You said you went to the 
movies last night (cue), but you really didn’t like the film you saw, right? (leading)”. 
Leading questions can be asked in various forms including a straightforward lead (e.g., 
“Isn’t it a fact that….?; You’re not suggesting…?; You tell the truth, I take it?; That’s the 
reason…”), a taunting/critical lead (e.g., “Surely you don’t believe that…do you?; Surely 
you’re not suggesting that…?; Do you really think that?; Obviously…?; Anyone 
would…wouldn’t they?”), a justification lead (e.g., “You were only doing what comes 
naturally, weren’t you?; Anyone could see that she had pushed you too far this time, 
hadn’t she?”), or an incriminating lead (e.g., “You’ve got to admit that…?; You knew 
that what you were doing was wrong, didn’t you?”). Additionally, a leading utterance 
may be presented in the form of a statement (instead of as a question). For example, 
“Obviously then, you were aware of her relationship with Bob Loblaw.”   
IMPORTANT NOTE: When coding cross examination interviews, it is necessary 
to keep in mind the information that the witness provided during the direct examination. 
Utterances throughout the cross examination may appears to be leading in structure, 
however, the information that is being inquired about might have been previously 
provided by the current witness on the stand. For example, assume that at some point 
LAWYERS’ QUESTIONING PRACTICES 
 
103 
 
during the direct examination the witness said: “Kenny had N64 games in his room and 
played them all the time”. Next, assume that during the cross-examination the questioner 
asks the witness: “Kenny just played a bunch of games in his room, didn’t he?” Although 
this question is presented in a leading format, this example would actually be coded as 
clarification because the information being discussed has previously been provided by the 
current witness on the stand. In contrary, however, if witness #1 provided specific 
information during their interview (e.g., “Witness #1: Kenny had N64 games in his 
room”), but the primary questioner incorporates this information into a question while 
interviewing Witness #3 (e.g., “Lawyer: So I understand that your brother, Kenny, had a 
bunch of Nintendo 64 games in his room, right?”), then the question asked to Witness #3 
is actually a leading question. See the Clarification section of this guide for additional 
information.  
Forced Choice: This type of question only offers the witness a limited, usually 
two, number of response options. “Did you kick or punch the other woman?” would be 
an example of a forced choice question. Cueing the witness before the question (with 
previously stated information) is still only coded as forced choice. For example, “You 
said you went to the movies last night (cue), now did you go to the early show or the late 
show? (forced choice)”. 
Opinion: This involves posing a personal opinion or belief to a witness related to 
the allegations before the court. For example, “I think you assaulted Mr. Norman”, “I 
suggest that you…”, “I put it to you…” would all be classified as an opinion.  
Statement: This refers to a statement of fact. This can be coded for utterances that 
dictate the direction of where the conversation is going, or is a verbal declaration that is 
not in the form of a question.  For example, “Now Ms. Thomas, that water is there for 
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you.”, or “Let’s take a break and rise at 2pm.”, or “For the record, the witness has pointed 
to the accused.” would be coded as a statement. 
Command: This refers to a questioner giving a directive or telling the witness to 
do something. For example, utterance’s like “Just point him out.” or “Speak up now” 
would be considered as commands. Other examples of commands include: a court 
official (e.g., the judge) passing control of the proceedings to another court official (e.g., 
“Lawyer #1: Okay, Mr. Adams, that’s all the questions I have.  My friend may have some 
though. (statement). Judge: Mr. Fisher (command). Lawyer #2: Okay, did you buy a 
ticket to the movies last night? (closed)”); a court official (e.g., the judge) directing the 
proceedings by saying things like “Cross-exam?”, “Re-exam?”, “You can step down”; or 
stating that evidence is to be made an exhibit or consent in court (e.g., “I suggest we call 
this exhibit CL No.1”).  
Multiple:  This question type involves the primary interviewer asking several 
questions at once, without giving the witness a chance to respond after each question. An 
example of this would be, “How did you get there? What did you do inside? Did you say 
anything to him?” In multiple question cases, note the question types that follow in order. 
In this example, the utterance would be coded as Multiple, but note that the question 
types were: Probing, Probing, and Closed, respectively. Cueing the witness before the 
questions is still only coded as multiple. For example, “You said you went to the movies 
last night (cue), what movie did you see? Did you like the movie? How long was the 
movie? (multiple – probing, closed, probing)”. 
Re-asked: This variable is scored if the questioner re-asks a question that the 
witness has already answered at an earlier point in the session. For example, “Lawyer: 
Where did you go last night? (probing) / Witness: Nowhere. I stay home. / Lawyer: 
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Okay, come on Fred, where did you go out to last night? (re-asked). NOTE: 
Questions/utterances that the witness misheard or misunderstood are not coded as re-
asked. For example, “Lawyer: Is that an assumption based on what he normally wears? 
(closed) / Witness: Pardon? / Lawyer: Is that an assumption based on what you see 
him normally wear? (closed – NOT re-asked).” In this example, both of these questions 
are to be coded as closed.  
Clarification: This question type is defined as any question where the questioner 
duplicates or paraphrases the information from any of the current witness’ previous 
answers (these answers could have been provided during either of the direct examination 
or cross examination) in order to provide the questioner with a better understanding what 
the witness said. A duplicate example of a clarification question would be as follows: 
“Witness: John said he went to a movie. Questioner: Okay, so John went to a movie? 
(clarification) Witness: Yes, that’s right.” A paraphrase example of a clarification 
question would be as follows: “Witness: We arrived home shortly before 7:00pm and 
hung out for two to three hours. / Lawyer: So roughly, I gather from what you’re saying, 
you and her were at your house for a few hours together (clarification). / Witness: 
Between two and three, yes.” Other examples of clarification include the questioner 
repeating the spelling for names of persons or places (e.g., “Lawyer: How do you spell 
Portugal Cove? (probing) / Witness: P-O-R-T-U-G-A-L / Lawyer: P-O-R-T-U-G-A-L 
Cove. Okay, thank you. (clarification)”, or speaking utterances such as, “I’m sorry?”, 
“Pardon me?”, or “I didn’t catch that.”  
IMPORTANT NOTE: It is important that clarification questions be considered 
within the context of the present conversation. Although a question may appear in the 
format of another utterance style (i.e., closed, probing, leading), the questioner’s intention 
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may be for clarification purposes, and can be determined by analyzing the surrounding 
conversation contexts. For example: “Witness: I live at 230 Elizabeth. / Lawyer: You said 
230 Elizabeth, do you mean Elizabeth Avenue? (this question appears in a closed 
structure format [i.e. ‘do you…’], but the intention is for clarification) / Witness: Yes. / 
Judge: Where did you say? (this question appears in the probing structure format [ 
‘where…’], but the intention is for clarification).”   
NOTE: Any information that the primary questioner received or uses from a 
different witness at an earlier point during the trial is not clarification and would be 
considered leading (see the Leading section of this guide for additional information). 
Facilitator: This refers to verbal utterances that encourages the flow of 
conversation, or are said between utterance spoken by someone else (i.e., witness, judge, 
clerk, opposing attorney). For example, “Um-hmm”, “Yes”, “Thank you”, “Okay”, 
“Sure”, “I see”, or “Sorry for interrupting” would be coded as facilitators. Note that 
facilitators are not coded when they are expressed at the beginning of an utterance that 
contains a question. For example, in the statement, “Okay, yes. So when did you meet 
Joe?”, the initial communication (i.e., ‘Okay, yes’) is ignored, and the rest of the 
utterance is coded as a the correct question type (i.e., probing).  
Incomplete: This is coded when the question is not finished being asked because 
the questioner was interrupted or cut off by another speaker or witness, or because the 
questioner did not complete the thought. For example: “Lawyer: So how often would you 
–” would be coded as incomplete. Additionally, utterances deemed “(inaudible)” or 
“(unintelligible)” by the transcriber are also coded as incomplete. For example: “Lawyer: 
Okay, and (unintelligible).” would be coded as incomplete. However, if the utterance 
contain enough information to properly categorize the question, then code the utterance 
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accordingly. For example: “Lawyer: Did you send this email here dated (inaudible) to 
John?” Furthermore, utterances that appear incomplete, but contain enough information 
to determine the direction and/or interpretation of the question can be coded into their 
proper question category, too. For example, “Lawyer: So how often would you fight with 
your sisters, Maria and Eliz - ”, would still be coded as a probing question, because 
enough information is presented to determine the question’s intent.  
 
 Section 4: Utterance Purpose 
Utterance Number: This is the unique tracking code assigned to each utterance 
made by a questioner or court official on the transcript. If the first utterance in the 
transcript is the witness talking (e.g., stating their name), then this utterance is not 
labelled as ‘utterance #1’. Rather, the first utterance by a court official is the true first 
utterance. All other questions/utterances thereafter (regardless of whom is asking the 
question) are coded consecutively. Additionally, Utterances can be broken over more 
than one line in the examination transcript, but would still only be coded as a single 
utterance for the speaker. For example, the following “broken” exchange between the 
lawyer and witness would be coded as a single utterance by the lawyer: 
 Lawyer: When you stated that – 
 Witness: Yes 
 Lawyer: - you picked up Bob at the –  
 Witness: Okay, right 
 Lawyer: - store, did you note the time? 
However, an exception to this is when the witness answers the questioner before 
the questioner has completed their utterance. For example, the following “broken” 
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exchange between the lawyer and witness would be coded as two separate utterances (as 
indicated by the number in parenthesis) by the lawyer:  
Lawyer: (1) Okay. Do you recall any contact between your father and 
Emily – 
 Witness: No. 
Lawyer: - during those occasions? (2) Okay. Do you recall any occasion 
when the three of you were in the room together?  
 Witness: No. 
 
Speaker: This is the type of person who is stating the utterance. It can be any of 
the court officials and is determined by reading details within the transcript. Examples 
include, but are not limited to: the Crown, Defence, Judge, Clerk, or Accused. 
 
Section 4.1: Utterance Purpose 
Administrative: This refers to any utterance that is considered to be a procedural 
aspect of the courtroom. It can be legal actions or references to any aspect unrelated to 
the case/charges being heard. For example, if the judge or attorney tells the witness that 
the microphone is not there to amplify their voice, then this utterance would be coded as 
administrative. Other examples include when the court officials interact with each other 
and are not directing their utterances toward the witness, or are not talking about 
information related to the case. For example: “Lawyer #1 (directed to witness): Why 
don’t you remember the conversation with Emily? (probing / case-based) / Lawyer #2 
(directed to the judge): Well how can he possibly answer that? (probing / administrative) 
/ Lawyer #1 (directed to judge): I’d like the witness to answer, Mr. Justice (statement / 
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administrative) / Judge (directed to Lawyer #2): Okay. Elaborate on the concern 
(command / administrative).” Another example might include when a court official 
inquires as to whether counsel has access to evidence being referred to in court (e.g., 
“Witness: May I refer to my police note to recall the time of the incident? Lawyer #1: 
Yes (facilitator-purpose unknown). Judge (directed to opposing counsel): Have these 
notes been disclosed to you? (closed-administrative). Lawyer #2: Yes, I do. Thank you. 
(facilitator-purpose unknown).    
Case-based: This refers to any utterance that is both directly and indirectly related 
to the case being heard. For example, any questions asking about the crime, or 
information leading up to the crime would be scored as case-based. There are two 
subcategories of case-based utterance purposes that need to be sub-scored. The first type 
is information gathering, and these utterances target unique details of what transpired 
with respect to the crime. For example, “Lawyer: Okay, just describe what happened 
when you saw the body on the floor.” would be coded as an open-ended question with an 
information gathering case-based purpose. The second type is challenging the 
accounts/details, and this occurs when the questioner raises points to challenge the 
reliability of the witness’ accounts. For example, “Lawyer: Now, at least one officer 
asked you whether you touched her, and at that time you said that you didn’t remember.  
Now you’re saying you never touched her.  Do you see any difference in that?” would be 
coded as a closed question with a challenging case-based purpose. Other examples 
include, “Lawyer: Is it possible that you did say these things, but don’t remember?” 
Purpose Unknown: This is to say that the utterance’s purpose does not fit into the 
category of case-based or administrative. Typically, purpose unknown is applied when 
the utterance type is coded as incomplete or facilitator.  
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Appendix C – Transcript Coding Guide 
Section 1: Case Characteristics 
 
Case Number: ___________________________    
 
 
Year: ______________ 
 
  
Crime Type:    Person  Property Hybrid  Unknown 
 
 
 
Section 2: Transcript Characteristics  
 
 
Transcript Number: ___________ 
 
 
Examination Type:   Direct Examination    Cross Examination  
 
 
 
 
Questioner ID:    
 
 
Questioner Type:   Crown  Defence  
 
 
Questioner Gender:  Male   Female 
 
 
 
 
Witness ID:     
 
 
Witness Type:   Victim  Eyewitness  Police Officer   
 
Defendant  Character  Expert (specify: _________ ) 
 
 
Witness Gender:   Male  Female
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Sections 3 & 4: Frequency of Question Types and Assumed Purpose 
 
Number of Times Question Appeared in Transcript 
 
 
Question Type 
 
 
Frequency 
   
Question Type 
 
Frequency 
  
Question Type 
 
Frequency 
 
Open 
 
   
Forced Choice 
   
Re-asked 
 
 
Probing 
 
   
Opinion 
   
Clarification 
 
 
Closed Yes/No 
 
   
Statement 
   
Facilitator 
 
 
Leading 
 
   
Command 
   
Incomplete 
 
    
Multiple 
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Number of Time Utterance Purpose Appeared in Transcript 
 
 
Utterance Purpose 
 
Frequency 
 
 
Purpose Unknown (N/A) 
 
 
 
Administrative 
 
 
 
Case-based 
 
 
 
     Information Gathering 
 
 
 
     Challenging 
  
 
 
Grand Total 
 
 
 
